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The explosion of Internet Of Things (IoT), embedded and “smart” devices has
also seen the addition of “general purpose” single board computers also referred to as
“edge devices.” Determining if one of these generic devices meets the need of a new
given task however can be challenging. Software generically written to be portable or
plug and play may be too bloated to work properly without significant modification
due to much tighter hardware resources. Previous work in this area has been focused
on micro or chip-level benchmarking which is mainly useful for chip designers or
low level system integrators. A higher or macro level method is needed to not only
observe the behavior of these devices under a load but ensure they are appropriately
configured for the new task, especially as they begin being integrated on platforms
with higher cost of failure like self driving cars or drones.
In this research we propose a macro level methodology that iteratively benchmarks
and optimizes specific workloads on edge devices. With automation provided by
Ansible, a multi stage 2k full factorial experiment and robust analysis process ensures
the test workload is maximizing the use of available resources before establishing
a final benchmark score. By framing the validation tests with a family of network
security monitoring applications an end to end scenario fully exercises and validates
the developed process. This also provides an additional vector for future research in
the realm of network security. The analysis of the results show the developed process
met it’s original design goals and intentions, with the added fact that the latest edge
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The explosion of Internet Of Things (IoT), embedded and “smart” devices has
been driven by the increased availability of minimized hardware that carries enough
computing power to accomplish very specific applications. This market has also seen
the addition of “general purpose” single board computers also referred to as “edge
devices.” This terminology is lent from the fact a portion of computation tradition-
ally performed by a centralized point is moved down to a more tactical or perhaps
disconnected level (e.g. a drone flying itself or perhaps an ATM detecting fraud on
it’s own based upon the users body language). Some vendors go as far as saying their
15 watt single board computer is a “supercomputer on a chip” [4].
Determining if one of these generic devices meets the need of a new given task
however can be challenging. By design there is not much tolerance for hardware
resource abuse either in the code running on them or from any operating system
controls. Suddenly software generically written to be portable or plug and play may
be too bloated to work properly without significant modification. In addition, while
some of these edge devices may act independently others may be working together
over a mesh network like ZigBee or 802.11s. If a comprehensive view of system
performance is desired, some form of automated simultaneous testing is required.
Previous work in this area has been focused on micro or chip-level benchmarking
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Figure 1: Scale of Edge-Like Devices [5]
[6]. These efforts are mainly useful for chip designers or low level system integrators.
A higher or macro level method is required to not only observe the behavior of these
devices under a load but ensure they are appropriately configured for the task.
1.2 Research Objectives
The objective of this research is to develop and document a macro level method-
ology to optimize and benchmark specific workloads on edge devices. The specific
workload and thus specific performance metric needs to be interchangeable in order to
best apply to all the possible scenarios an edge device may be employed (e.g. frames
per second for a image tracker, power consumption for a battery powered drone, or
packets dropped for a network monitor).
By framing the development with a family of network security monitoring applica-
tions an end to end scenario fully exercises and validates the developed process. This
also provides an additional vector for future research in the realm of network security.
Internet based security appliances which are classically done in a centralized fashion
would likely stand to benefit from an edge-like deployment scenario. Decentralized
sensors would greatly enhance the ability to monitor niche enclaves and devices that
2
historically have gone completely unprotected but carry much of the same risks (e.g.
All-in-one printers or video teleconference suites) [7].
1.2.1 Design Goals
In order to apply as broadly as possible, be academically sound and actually
useful, the methodology was built inline the following goals:
1. Be easy to use, modify, and scale as appropriate
• In order to be a general methodology, it needs to easy accept different test
workloads
• Each workload will have a unique set of variable factors to consider
• Each physical device may not have the same resources which should be
accounted for
• In cases where workloads are spread across multiple devices, the method-
ology must be able to test them all at the same time
2. Support a repeatable consistent baseline
• For repeatability, it should be easy to deploy and carry no hidden system
changes or tuning
3. Maximize the use of available hardware
• Because of tight performance envelopes, ensure the result is utilizing the
maximum extent of resources possible (i.e. reduce idle or blocking condi-
tions)
4. Utilize a robust statistical analysis capability
• In order to provide rigor to the result. In cases where statistical tests
breakdown (i.e. non-normality), provide a backup test.
1.2.2 Implementation
The first two goals were met with the implementation of an automated work-
flow. The core of this automation was created using Ansible which is an open-source
software provision, configuration, and application deployment tool [8] while further
3
interchangeable sub-modules perform the results analysis. The pairing of these two
allow both the workload and response metric to be swappable.
Maximizing the use of the hardware is met through the operator selecting up
to five potential optimization factors which are then tested in a 2k Full Factorial
experiment design. This ensures any positive or negative interactions between any
factor are appropriately captured. By running the automation workflow multiple
times in series, a multi-stage optimization process emerges that can find the “ideal”
level for a given factor (e.g. sizing a buffer in memory without under or oversizing
it).
The results once captured are analyzed one of two ways. By performing a Anal-
ysis of Variance (ANOVA) test it becomes possible to put rigor behind the result,
associating the probability that any given result was just due to random luck. In
cases where the ANOVA model fails to fit a simpler arithmetic comparison provides
a simpler result.
1.2.3 Validation
Once the methodology was developed, it was exercised and validated with a series
of network monitoring applications. The particular applications tested were based off
real world Air Force network monitoring pipeline roles (Section 2.1.3.1) and focused
on the performance metric of packet loss. In addition each test has a unique selection
of optimization factors which are evaluated in the 2k full factorial fashion. While a
secondary effort these tests establish a worthwhile baseline for future work discussed
in Section 5.2.2 and Appendix B.
4
1.3 Document Overview
This document is broken into 4 more chapters. First motivations and background
are discussed in Chapter II while the methodology is discussed and implemented in
Chapter III. Chapter IV validates the methodology through a examination of three
network monitoring applications and Chapter V presents the conclusion and future
work.
Select raw data used in the figures is shown in Appendix C while all the core
re-usable code with a user guide is presented in Appendix D. Full code, data, and
instructions will also be available electronically [9].
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II. Background and Literature Review
Initial motivations for this work was framed around finding a solution to the
gaps that exist in enterprise network defenses [7]. Recent modern network security
suites and tactics have been very focused on high vantage points and large centralized
collection points. This provides high visibility into all traffic flowing into and out of the
protected network but can neglect side to side or “lateral” traffic. By decentralizing
the classical threat hunting platform with smaller, external sensor suites close to the
protected clients (“the edge”) we reduce the hardware requirement from monitoring
a whole enterprise to just one or a handful of hosts.
The solution to this problem presented another. The candidate edge devices that
could perform this task come in all shapes and sizes and no method exists to examine
how they perform under a given workload. This was further compounded by the edge
device’s tighter hardware budgets that are less tolerant to unoptimized configurations.
Figure 2 below visually summarizes the relationship of the problems and direction of
this work.
Figure 2: Visual summary of the relationship between the research problems and
direction of this work
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This chapter examines the background of these problems much deeper. Section
2.1 breaks down the evolution of contemporary network monitoring to examine the
blind spot problem and can be skipped if only interested in the second problem, which
is discussed in Section 2.2.
2.1 Problem Domain - Network Defense
Computer network defense has evolved from an afterthought to a multi-billion
dollar industry [10]. Despite the attention and focus gaps still remain that are targeted
by adversarial forces for personal or political gain. This section looks at the origin
of contemporary tactics, modern threats to them and associated emerging counter
tactics.
2.1.1 Network Defense Background
Early Days c. 1970-1989
The Internet’s (and thus Cyberspace’s) primordial days were less concerned about
security and more about just raw functionality. The noble beginnings of ARPANET
for sharing information either between universities or government agencies had little
need for security if everyone who was connected was “trusted.” David D. Clark, an
Internet pioneer and chief protocol architect once said
Its not that we didn’t think about security, We knew that there were un-
trustworthy people out there, and we thought we could exclude them [11].
Later, Clarks’ seminal 1988 paper detailing the design principles of early internet
protocols included no mention of security [11] [12]. Unfortunately, in an effort to get
more nodes connected the barrier to entry was quite low, and the popularity of the net
grew faster then it could be contained. It was around this time that the net saw its
first large scale infections and attacks with the Morris worm in 1988 [13], international
7
military espionage at the hands of KGB agents in 1986 [14], and malicious insiders
trying to gain unauthorized access to Bell Labs [15]. As a result the naive “trust”
that built the early Internet began to dissolve, meaning some form of security needed
to be added to a system that didn’t even consider it. Thus the emergence of “bolt-on”
security began to unfold with the multi billion dollar cyber security industry (valued
104 billion in 2017 [10]). Networks began segregating themselves with devices like
firewalls and proxies. System administrators and owners could now only trust their
own users (which thanks to insiders and phishing we see later that’s a bad idea)
leading us to the era of the great filters, choke points and sensors that still remain in
place today.
Passive / Reactionary Defenses c. 1990-2010+
While the early network based firewalls did their jobs blocking traffic off of simple
source/destination filters this was only the first step in the game of cat-and-mouse
that defenders and attackers have been playing ever since [16]. While there may
have been a relative calm in the early nineties thanks to the tightening of boundaries
hackers soon shifted their focus to striking the weakest link: the user. No number of
security appliances or software could stop a user from giving up their password to a
clever social engineering campaign or stop them from clicking a bad link.
The mid to late nineties saw the first large scale phishing campaigns with AOHell
in 1995 [17], the melissa virus in 1999 [18] and the ILOVEYOU worm in 2000 [19]. By
simply sending gullible users believable messages attackers were able to bypass these
newly erected barriers with ease. The modus operandi for criminals quickly shifted
with the rise of e-commerce and e-banking in the early to mid 2000s [20]. Figure
3 below shows a near exponential increase in reported phishing attacks towards the
end of the decade. The early 2010s saw the first (caveat, reported) high profile tar-
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geted phishing attacks for motivations that were likely not financial. In 2011 Chinese
phishing campaigns began targeting US and South Korean government officials for
political or espionage gain [21]. The same year US defense contractors were breached
in a multi stage attack on themselves and their security vendor RSA Security LLC
[22].
Figure 3: Phishing campaign reports by year [23]
Perhaps even more nefarious are compromised accounts that bypass all security
measures without raising any alarm. From 1998-1999 one of the first ever large
scale Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) hunts “MOONLIGHT MAZE” began with
Wright-Patterson and Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) at it’s epicenter
thanks to a compromised account. The recently declassified report shows suspected
Russian actors combing through and collecting thousands of sensitive but unclassified
documents from the base, the school, and a handful of national labs. While the initial
vector was a compromised account the actual beginning of the infiltration is unknown
and was only discovered by accident from a careful admin reviewing logs [24]. This
prompted many in the Department of Defense (DOD) to consider creating a third
“public / business partners” network essentially transforming Non-classified Inter-
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net Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET) into an totally disconnected unclassified
version of it’s cousin Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET). History
tells us this didn’t happen but instead the branches adapted the “defense in depth”
strategy that is discussed further below [25].
It was in this era the realization that even internal users could not be trusted began
to take hold. A variety of different strategies were born each with their own side-
effects in an attempt to deal with the ever growing problem. Defense-in-depth or multi
layered defenses is one such strategy re-popularized by the National Security Agency
(NSA) that has been around since medieval castle times [26] [27]. Unfortunately,
it’s a poor analogy at best, as the original strategy involves layering defenses and
purposefully ceding land in such a way to allow time for a counterattack and ultimate
defeat of the aggressor. As poignantly pointed out by one author, this approach
doesn’t really work for cyber defense since 1.) There is typically not any “land” to
cede and 2.) You typically can not counterattack and then wipe out the adversary
for good. This broad “just layer more defenses” leaves too much interpretation to
the operator and the free market. A false sense of security can easily result and its
general failure as a strategy is clear in the eight large multi-million dollar hacks that
happened in the publishing year alone [28]. What we’re left with is a fragmented,
compartmentalized mess that makes it very difficult for defenders to actually defend
or fully understand the scale of.
Multiple standards and regulations thus came into existence to try and clearly
define what “secure” means. The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) has
been releasing Security Technical Implementation Guide (STIG) since as early as
1989. These guidelines are useful in trying to quantitatively define best practices
and when combined with other standards like DoD Instruction (DODI) 8510.01 DoD
Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation Process (DIACAP) and Na-
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tional Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-53 Se-
curity and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations a
system is likely better off then just hiding flaws behind multiple layers of firewalls.
Unfortunately, the panacea of a perfect security checklist does not exist nor will it
ever with the rapid pace of innovation in new software / hardware. The clash between
those enforcing these checklists (like DISA’s Command Cyber Readiness Inspection
(CCRI)) and those trying to meet the intent of the system owner is a common source
of friction. Luckily later revisions of DODI 8510.01 Risk Management Framework
better addresses this friction and allows system owners more say on the risk they are
willing to accept [29].
Despite all this, persistent adversaries continued their campaigns against both
governments and corporations alike. Reactionary detection was failing as was evident
in the year long loiter times of some campaigns. Chinese actors were indicated in the
three year long Titan Rain campaign (2003-2005) [30] and the year long Operation
Aurora (2009-2010) that targeted Google and other US based tech companies [31].
The importance of rooting out compromises increased dramatically in the 2010’s as
the threats shifted from espionage / stealing of documents to causing physical effects.
Stuxnet (2009-2010), widely regarded as the first “cyber weapon” was destroying
centrifuges for months before being discovered [32], and the Ukraine power grid shut-
down of 2015 had months of preparatory work on net before the obvious effect came
forward [33].
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Figure 4: Evolution of cyber attacks and their motivations [34]
These events precipitated the need for a more proactive approach to cyber defense.
At the end of the day these controls and measures only stop low sophistication attacks
and slow down the complex ones. Zero day exploits, spear phishing, social engineering
and insider threats still poised a very real danger.
Active / Proactive Hunting c. 2010+
The need to begin proactively defending was clear at the beginning of the 2010s.
As seen in figure 5 below, either the in-place defenses of these institutions failed /
are being manipulated, the local defenders are under staffed, trained or experienced
[35], or the overall network visibility and situational awareness across their enterprise
is severely lacking. (Note these are not mutually exclusive, and all three can be
happening to some degree to the point of compromise)
Figure 5: Cyber Attack Dwell Times (time between initial access and detection) in
days by Year [36]
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With multiple month and year long dwell times being uncovered (calculated as
the number of days an attacker is present on a victim network, from first evidence of
compromise to detection) a not so unreasonable fear began to muster for most large
enterprises and the military. “Have we been hacked and we don’t even know it yet?”
was probably a common phrase uttered in board meetings. While these enterprises
may have had well established incident response capabilities APTs had grown just
as comfortable evading their very predictable passive defenses [37]. Thus in the early
2010s many quickly turned to their forensic teams to figure this out, forming a new
breed of proactive investigators that became known as “Threat Hunters ”[38].
Where private companies like Mandiant and SANS began capitalizing on the new
opportunities taking care of corporate and international contracts, the military was
aggressively expanding their capabilities as well [38]. The Air Force created “Blue
Teams” in contrast to the traditional “Red Teams” with the goal of sweeping for
APT presence, scanning for better visibility while also assisting and training local
defenders [39] [40]. These teams later became the mold for United States Cyber
Command (USCYBERCOM)’s Cyber Protection Team (CPT)s which were coined as
the joint force equivalent to assess, sweep, repair, and instruct local defenders [41]
[42].
Many of these efforts contributed to the decrease in the median dwell time of
attackers as seen at the end of Figure 5 above. While historical forensics were carried
out looking for hard particular artifacts, the scale that hunt teams were responsible
for was potentially infinite (anything and everything, “unknown unknowns”). If the
signature of an exact attack was already known, its Indicator of Compromise (IOC)
could just be plugged into the signature based passive defenses. Thus as the name
implies, in order to be successful threat hunters typically require some information
about a valid threat such as the who (what nation states or actors), what (what are
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they after), when (is there a big event/anniversary coming up?), where (physical,
digital, or persona), and how (tools, techniques and procedures).
Deriving and gathering the sort of information needed to properly hunt threats is
still very challenging. Figure 6 below helps demonstrate this highlighting over 47%
of all discovered attacks still have a dwell time over 90 days. Sharing IOC has been a
hot area with a few government and private efforts like Structured Threat Informa-
tion eXpression (STIX) and Trusted Automated eXchange of Indicator Information
(TAXII) attempting to overcome the difficulty of sharing complex indicator data [43].
Many other organizations still struggle however with sharing potentially private or
proprietary secrets when revealing their compromises.
Figure 6: Global Cyber Attack Dwell Time Distribution [36]
2.1.2 Blindspots & Modern Threats
The current state of network defense can succinctly be visualized in Figure 7 be-
low. The intersection between a motivated actor, a vulnerability and an opportunity
ultimately leads to a compromise. The next few subsections examine these points
further.
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Figure 7: Threat Model depicting the current state of the art [44] [45]
2.1.2.1 Vulnerabilities / Gaps
The hardware requirement to maintain situational awareness of an entire enter-
prise can be substantial. Capturing traffic at line rates requires storage that can keep
up for the desired retention period, typically multiple terabytes (e.g. 152 TB is re-
quired to store two weeks at 1 Gbps sustained) [46]. Meanwhile processing thousands
of intrusion signatures on the same traffic requires dozens of CPU cores and a few hun-
dred gigabytes of RAM as detailed in the Suricata High Performance documentation
[47].
The best cost efficiency has historically come from tapping central egress/ingress
points as shown with the Air Force’s 16 gateways which was later driven to even
further cost sharing with the Army and larger DoD’s Joint Regional Security Stack
(JRSS) [48]. Threat hunters have leveraged this enhanced visibility to shorten dwell
times but gaps still remain in uninspected trusted insider zones as evidenced by the
latest Maindiant M-Trends Report [36] and even recent “Hack The Air Force” events
[49]. As seen below in section 2.1.2.2, many threat actors actively leverage these blind
spots and enjoy free reign as “trusted” lateral traffic [7].
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As an example, a critical vulnerability in HP all in one printers was recently
discovered by security researchers. By sending a specially crafted fax, it was possible
to establish a foothold on the printer which was then pivoted into an internal network.
This is thanks to the printer having a full blown Operating System (OS) shoved
into the device [50]. All command, control and data exfiltration was done over the
traditional phone line which means the only possible way this would have been spotted
was via the network traffic generating from the printer. While in this scenario this
enterprise could have had very robust boundary protections and inspections, it is
unlikely due to cost or bandwidth limitations that the traffic from this printer or the
random office “last mile” switch would be spanned or cloned to a sensor. Nor would
there be a host based agent riding on top the limited firmware.
Log shipping agents like Beats can be deployed on supported hosts / end-points to
help cover part of this gap though the number of unsupported appliances like printers
and video teleconferce suites as seen still contain enough of an operating system to
become a target. Even the supported hosts are susceptible to log manipulation, [51]
with many actors taking advantage of this and hiding their tracks [52] [53]. Not to
say it’s not worth collecting logs, as sometimes the sudden absence of certain events
may be an indicator in itself.
Unfortunately, logs only go far especially if valid credentials as being used as any
log entries will only show successes. Especially damning are third party based au-
thentication system compromises (like Kerberos and Active Directory) as in some
situations no log is generated good or bad. Introduced in 1988 by MIT the Ker-
beros authentication protocol is widely used as the backbone to how Active Directory
performs authentication. Microsoft’s implementation has interesting design choices
however that allow stateless ticket based attacks (and thus lateral movement) to work
[54].
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In many cases in place cyber defenses are not adequate to the task of proactive
searching and could become a target themselves [37]. As an example, the passive/re-
actionary suite of tools in Host Based Security System (HBSS) were not designed for
active threat hunting as any reactionary measures they perform require signatures
and other parts only report issues like patch compliance. In addition, variants of
these agents were attacked and disabled by malware in the Lazarus Group’s 2014
hack of Sony Pictures Entertainment [55].
2.1.2.2 Motivated Actors
Many open source databases have begun tracking APT and their specific tactics
and tools. The MITRE Corporation publishes the MITRE ATT&CK Matrix which
conglomerates sources from companies like Symantec, Mandiant, Microsoft, McAfee
and others. It has become a reference point for Air Force hunt operations and even
some endpoint protection suites. Table 1 below highlights a few actors who exploit
many of the items discussed above.
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Table 1: Sampling of threat actors observed exploiting factors discussed previously.

































“Zero day” lateral movement
Worldwide [60][61]
2.1.2.3 Opportunities
Just because a motivated actor exists and its target is vulnerable doesn’t mean a
compromise is imminent. The proper opportunity must still present itself, perhaps
as an improperly exposed port, a gullible user clicking a link, or a previous successful
attack that can be leveraged as a pivot. Some opportunities appear inline with
a vulnerability like a zero-day vulnerability or “Exploit Wednesday” and must be
addressed as quickly as possible since it is safe to assume a motivated actor is just
waiting for their chance [45].
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2.1.3 Emerging Defense Tactics
In the absence of any concrete indicators a threat hunter must begin to think like a
potential adversary. By becoming more aware of the state of the targets defenses like
gaps in their oversight or other trust relationships the hunter can narrow their search.
This brings us close to the present approach that has quickly gained popularity: “Big
Data or Data Analytics”. By aggregating as many data sources as possible together
(e.g. logs, packet captures, compliance scans, etc.) to form a comprehensive view
of an enterprise, anomalies quickly jump out to a trained eye or in even more recent
cases, a trained algorithm. This shift enables detection of “unknown unknowns” and
is especially interesting as it theoretically solves both the visibility and the experience
shortage, reducing the number of “trained/experienced” operators needed.
2.1.3.1 Big Data Pipelines
While many open source and commercial products exist that can implement a data
processing pipeline like this, the tools used/examined in this thesis will be based off
the open source Elastic stack (Beats, Elasticsearch, Logstash, Kibana). We select the
Elastic stack because a free-tier licence is available, it is used in Air Force systems, and
the stack’s popularity [62]. Below is an example of one such pipeline as implemented
in another open source project, the Response Operations Collection Kit Network
Security Monitor (RockNSM) suite.
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Figure 8: Example of the RockNSM sensor pipeline, a popular open source security
sensor suite [63]
Suricata is the signature based Intrusion Detection System (IDS), Google Stenog-
rapher captures raw packets and bro handles netflow and metadata. Logstatsh and
Kafka aggregate all types of logs and alerts to be stored in the Elasticsearch database
where it is reliably stored and indexed. Lastly Kibana provides rapid retrieval and
analysis of the data with user friendly dashboards and queries [63].
For some, a pipeline like this is achievable at an enterprise level depending on
budget and size. Unfortunately, for many the scale involved in aggregating hundreds
of thousands of workstation and server logs in the is no simple feat. Especially if not
planned for / budgeted in the initial build-out thanks to the bandwidth needed alone.
2.1.3.2 Mobile Hunt Platforms
While in large in place implementations of a data pipeline can be effective, hunt
teams commonly maintain their own suite of tools and sensors for either a unma-
nipulated third party perspective or to gain situational awareness on a enterprise
that lacks it. They are architected in a way to allow expandability and portability.
Traditionally this has meant airline friendly (weighing less then 100 pounds) transit
cases full of multiple high end server chassis that can run any variety of roles from
packet capture and Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) to Security Informa-
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tion and Event Management (SIEM) aggregators and compliance scanners. In early
2010 the Air Force led the way with their initial creation of a mobile “interceptor”
hunting platform, which later in 2013 became one of the first declared defensive cyber
weapons Cyberspace Vulnerability Assessment / Hunter (CVA/H) [64].
Having flexibility in these roles is crucial as no two landscapes are the same. Rack
space, available power, available cooling, and logical topology can all vary between
deployment locations. By allowing each role to be platform agnostic a robust and
scalable pipeline can be built on anything from a single physical machine to a half
rack full of equipment or even entirely virtual in a cloud provider.
Figure 9: Typical high performance network sensor server with an “airline approved”
hard sided transit case. Typical airline restrictions limit special checked items like
this to 100 lbs [65]
Unfortunately, these data pipeline implementations can suffer from the same prob-
lems as their large stationary counterparts. The cost and scale of their hardware can
limit their deployment scope which as seen previously in Section 2.1.2.1, leaves gaps
that adversaries have and will continue to exploit to achieve their goals.
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2.2 Solution Domain - Edge Devices
Where before the software involved in a contemporary data pipeline required sub-
stantial hardware that made edge deployment cost prohibitive, certain families of
embedded hardware have emerged that may be able to provide the functional capa-
bilities necessary to function as an edge sensor at a fraction of the cost.
2.2.1 Survey of Edge Devices
Edge devices come in an array of form factors, cost, and capability. Many come
in a Single Board Computer (SBC) configuration which includes things like standard
Input / Output (I/O) ports effectively making it an analog to a regular computer
tower. An example of this is the very low cost and educationally focused Raspberry
Pi boards. Another common configuration is a specialized ”compute module” which
contains the same core as its SBC sibling but has only raw pins instead of I/O ports.
These are intended for industrial applications and allow systems designers to build
their own carrier boards and just outsource the actual core component of it.
(a) Raspberry Pi 3B+ (b) Pi Compute Module 3+
Figure 10: Example of the same edge device on two significantly different form factors
Regardless of form factor the actual cores of these devices generally come in three
capability groups. The low cost Raspberry Pi is mainly targeted at educational
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and low risk uses [66]. Some devices come with a slightly more focused application
and specialization like the Google Coral which features specialized machine learning
accelerating hardware [67]. The higher tail of these devices are specialized workhorses
that feature very robust computing capability like the NVIDIA Jetson XAVIER and
are employed in higher risk environments like drones and automobiles [68].
For this research two lower cost SBC Raspberry Pi and three NVIDIA Jetson com-
pute modules on a carrier board were selected as the devices to evaluate. This range
of high and low should represent a good gradient of the commercially available devices
as of mid-2019. Table 2 below details more on these device specific components.
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Table 2: Selected readily available commercial off the shelf single board computers,
as of mid-2019
Device Component Value
NVIDIA TX1 Architecture aarch64
Compute Module Cores 4
Default Carrier CPU MHz 1734
2015 RAM 4GB
NIC & Driver Intel e1000e (PCIe x4)
Distribution Ubuntu 18.04.2
Kernel linux 4.9.140-tegra
Power Modes 6.5w / 15w
NVIDIA TX2 Architecture aarch64
Compute Module Cores 6* (technically 2/4, two die)
Default Carrier CPU MHz 2035
2017 RAM 8GB
NIC & Driver Intel e1000e (PCIe x4)
Distribution Ubuntu 18.04.3
Kernel linux 4.9.140-tegra
Power Modes 7.5W / 15W
NVIDIA AGX Xavier Architecture aarch64
Compute Module Cores 8
Default Carrier CPU MHz 2265
2018 RAM 8GB
NIC & Driver Marvel eqos (RGMII)
Distribution Ubuntu 18.04.2
Kernel linux 4.9.140-tegra
Power Modes 10w / 15w / 30w
Raspberry Pi 3B+ Architecture armv7l
SBC Cores 4
2018 CPU MHz 1400
RAM 1GB
NIC & Driver Microchip Tech lan78xx (usb2)
Distribution Raspbian 9.11 (stretch)
Kernel linux 4.19.66-v7+
Raspberry Pi 4 Architecture armv7l
SBC Cores 4
2019 CPU MHz 1500
RAM 4GB
NIC & Driver Broadcom bcmgenet (usb3)
Distribution Raspbian 10 (buster)
Kernel linux 4.19.75-v7l+
Form Factor Single Board Computer
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2.2.2 Edge Benchmarking Challenges
Properly evaluating if these edge devices would function as a network sensor is
not as straight forward as it sounds. With vastly more restrictive hardware budgets
compared to contemporary computer hardware there is no room for resource abuse
either in the applications running or even the operating system itself. These boards
are designed for low power consumption, thermal generation and cost. This typically
translates less silicon for things like RAM as seen in the Raspberry Pi offerings [69]
to slower Central Processing Unit (CPU) clocks or perhaps more aggressive power
saving features like entire chip disabling as seen in NVIDIA design guides [68] and
pre-installed power profiles [70].
This can be compounded by the very “generic” kernels that vendors build for these
devices as they can not predict the ultimate use case. As an example if power con-
sumption was a crucial performance factor and a workload was placed on a headless
Raspberry Pi running Raspian with no modification, the “score” would be skewed
by the fact the the HDMI port is powered up by default utilizing 30mA despite no
monitor being plugged in [71]. Likewise the default NVIDIA JetPack Software De-
velopment Kit (SDK) utilizes an Ubuntu image which includes a full blown GNOME
Graphical User Interface (GUI), which consumes resources like memory even if no
display is connected.
Figure 11: Screenshot of the running processes on a headless TX1. The GUI and
related sub-processes are shown using approx 21% of the available memory, despite
no monitor or remote desktop services being enabled
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Likewise for a network monitoring application like Suricata or Snort the default
engine settings will work out of the box but quickly can become overwhelmed by too
much traffic even on modest hardware [47] [72]. Both of these tools have a large array
of tunable controls that requires consideration of hardware variables like number of
cores, interrupt balance and available memory in addition to expected traffic patterns
like a lot of small Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) sessions (“flows”) or a few
large flow sessions. Many cases are not black and white either with some variables
acting like a sliding scale. For instance, the Network Interface Card (NIC) rx ring
buffers are set very small by default with low per packet latency in mind which may
not really matter when raw throughput is the only critical statistic. Too large of
a rx ring however like one larger then the CPU cache size may have a detrimental
effect.
Previous authors have contributed IDS benchmarking research which provides a
foundation to test from. A survey by Khalil [72] examines the three big common
IDS tools (Bro, Snort, Suricata). Bu [73] examines the impact of virtualization and
containerization on Suricata while another group compared and contrasted the single
threaded performance of Snort versus the multi threaded Suricata in both live and
offline (pcap) scenarios [74]. For both previous works they utilized traffic replay
utilities to simulate live traffic. While possible to test the engine functionality by
reading directly from a traffic capture file this excludes about 20-30% of the actual
engine pipeline from test and there is no real-time urgency to get through the traffic
before it gets dropped out of a buffer [75].
Other previous efforts in benchmarking edge devices have primarily been focused
on the micro, or chip and architecture scale. MiBench (2001) was an open source
suite of tests built targeting embedded like systems [76]. They featured 35 small
scale tests based on different categories like basic math and image recognition for
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“auto/industrial” or AES, SHA and Dijkstra for “security/network.” A more recent
update ParMiBench (2010) updated the suite for multi core embedded devices [6].
These tests mainly satisfy chip designers and integrators however which is much too
focused for purposes of this research. A broader approach is to take a macro, or
end to end, look at the system to test it. One of the only such papers found to
discuss such a benchmark on single board systems was still niche in it’s findings and
implementation, observing only how one application performed across a few different
vendors [77]. A variation of this approach however is likely the best course of action
to evaluate an application as a whole.
As can be seen simply dropping any particular tool and running it in a pure de-
fault environment will not provide a significant indicator of peak performance. To
ensure a fair assessment of how an edge device can handle a particular workload,
a macro benchmark framework is needed that would allow a wide array of applica-
tions to be tested each with their own configuration, optimization, and desired result
considerations.
2.3 Summary
This chapter discussed how the state of the art in cyber defense has arrived at large
centralized detection platforms. These platforms while successful still allow blind
spots that enable unwanted adversarial presence and action. The rapid advancement
of versatile single board computers presents an opportunity to fill these coverage gaps.
In order to proceed further with answering if these small devices can perform network
monitoring, a macro benchmarking methodology is developed and introduced in the
first half of Chapter III. The second half implements and validates the overall process
with network monitoring applications.
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III. Methodology
As highlighted in section 2.2.1 the embedded machine market has recently seen the
addition of “edge devices” that are capable of running traditional operating systems
and applications. While plenty of tools are available that can benchmark individ-
ual components like the Central Processing Unit (CPU) or Random Access Memory
(RAM), no higher or macro level method exists to establish how an application per-
forms end to end on a given device. This is further complicated by the trap that the
limited hardware of such a device may not play well with “plug-and-play” software.
This chapter proposes a methodology and automation framework to not only observe
the peak performance of a task on an edge device but ensure they are appropriately
configured for the task.
Section 3.1 discusses the overall design goals and their motivations while Section
3.2.2 details a specific framework that implements them. Section 3.3 then prepares
the automation framework with a particular series of network monitoring tests to
fully exercise and validate the developed process.
3.1 Design Goals
The following design goals drove the overall development and each is detailed
below.
1. Be easy to use, modify, and scale as appropriate
2. Support a repeatable consistent baseline
3. Maximize the use of available hardware
4. Utilize a robust statistical analysis capability
Ease of Use Since edge devices move computation to the tactical or consumer
level and not a central point the scale of devices can quickly grow out of hand. Man-
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ually connecting and configuring each one would be a daunting task so naturally
automation becomes important. Even on non edge devices enterprises have strug-
gled to keep up with the scale demand of either large physical networks or rapidly
ephemeral virtual ones [78]. A plethora of “IT Automation” tools like Chef, Ansible,
and Jenkins have emerged to help deal with these problems [79]. By adopting one
of these tools the scale of testing multiple devices at once becomes much more man-
ageable. This also reduces custom or esoteric code that becomes hard to transition
between efforts or projects.
Consistent Baseline An important aspect of any experiment is accounting for
any nuisance or noise factors. This is especially true for testing complex systems that
have multiple layers of abstraction. One small change on the top could have large
unpredictable consequences on the layers and ultimate performance below. Taking a
smart phone or even laptop from a few years back provides a great example. Upon
release, the device performs well up to the users expectations. A year later a new
Operating System (OS) version arrives with new “features” and performance of the
device drops significantly. The increased load of adding a few screen transitions,
maybe a transparent menu or the overhead of allowing videos to play in the back-
ground become too much for the underlying hardware which was abstracted away
from the user and perhaps even the developer.
For this reason a key part of the methodology needs to ensure any modifications
from a clean vendor baseline are applied consistently across devices and are either
traceable (written down, scripted) or non-persistent (undone with a reboot). Some
factors are unable to be accounted for and they are discussed in the Limiting Factors
(Section 3.2.4).
Maximizing Hardware Utilization As seen in Section 2.2.2 simply dropping
any particular tool and running it in a pure default environment will not provide a
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significant indicator of peak performance. It is for that reason that this methodol-
ogy needs to support applying pre-selected optimizations at varying levels to find the
“best fit” for the device under test before giving a final score judgement. This can
be accomplished via a multi-stage optimization loop which iteratively increases or
decreases the selected optimization factors to observe at what level the system per-
forms the best. In order to fully examine the potential optimization solution space a
2k full factorial experiment design is needed. This allows factors to be both individ-
ually tested and tested together to observe any possible constructive or destructive
interference [80].
Table 3: Example of optimization factor combinations where each letter is any possible
configuration or system state. The presence of the letter indicating that particular
option is “high” while absence means “low.”
Factor Count Combinations
21 A
22 A, B, AB
23 A, B, AB, C, AC, BC, ABC
24
A, B, AB, C, AC, BC, ABC
D, AD, BD, ABD, CD, ACD, BCD, ABCD
25
A, B, AB, C, AC, BC, ABC
D, AD ,BD, ABD, CD, ACD, BCD, ABCD
E, AE, BE, ABE, CE, ACE, BCE, ABCE, DE,
ADE, BDE, ABDE, CDE, ACDE, BCDE, ABCDE
Robust Analysis Analyzing the results from the multi stage optimization loop
can be performed by any array of tests from simple mean comparisons to full blown
statistical tests. Ideally a statistical test like Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) can
precisely determine if the optimizations chosen are actually having a desired impact
and not just due to random noise. The usefulness of the ANOVA test depends heavily
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on assumptions of normality however. In cases where normality appears violated a
secondary test should be supported that is able to continue testing until no further
improvement is observed. In all cases the definition of what improvement is should
be user definable.
3.2 General Test Methodology
Considering the goals, Figure 12 below presents a visual of the proposed method-
ology. Working from the inside most process out (or bottom up according to the
figure, this section lays out a specific end to end implementation. This specific im-
plementation is also visually presented later in Figure 14.
3.2.1 Analysis Design
Two separate tests have been implemented to satisfy the robust analysis require-
ment. First, a ANOVA test is implemented that can analyze up to k = 5 factors of
a 2k Factorial Factorial design. A backup test is then implemented around the same
lines that performs a much simpler sample mean comparison. The results of either
one of these tests is used to inform the feedback loop of the multi-stage optimization
process.
3.2.1.1 ANOVA
While a multitude of commercial software like JMP, Minitab, and Design-Expert
exist that performs advanced statistical tests they can be expensive and/or difficult to
integrate [80]. Following the process outlined in Chapters 3,5, and 6 in Montgomery’s
Design and Analysis of Experiments (9th Edition) [80] we can re-create the process
needed to perform an ANOVA test on a multi-factor experiment like this. The Python
code listed below in Snippet 1 implements these steps to create a table like Table 4.
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Figure 12: High level flow diagram of the proposed testing methodology
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Table 4: Example ANOVA Table for 3-Factor Test [80]
Factor
Variation
Sum of Square Degrees of Freedom Mean Squares F0
A SSA a− 1 MSA F0 = MSAMSError
B SSB b− 1 MSB F0 = MSBMSError
C SSC c− 1 MSC F0 = MSCMSError
AB SSAB (a− 1)(b− 1) MSAB F0 = MSABMSError
AC SSAC (a− 1)(c− 1) MSAC F0 = MSACMSError
BC SSBC (b− 1)(c− 1) MSBC F0 = MSBCMSError
ABC SSABC (a− 1)(b− 1)(c− 1) MSABC F0 = MSABCMSError
Error SSError abc(n− 1) MSError
Total SSTotal abcn− 1
Where
a, b, c = number of levels for each main factor (1)
























SSError = SSTotal − SSFactors (7)
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Snippet 1 Sample of the 3 factor code from anova.py that builds an ANOVA table.
Full code is available in Appendix D
1 ...
2 if(k >= 3):
3 df_index=['A', 'B', 'AB', 'C', 'AC', 'BC', 'ABC', 'Error', 'Total']
4 c = response_var[response_var['code'] == 'C'].loc[:,rv[1]].to_numpy()
5 ac = response_var[response_var['code'] == 'AC'].loc[:,rv[1]].to_numpy()
6 bc = response_var[response_var['code'] == 'BC'].loc[:,rv[1]].to_numpy()
7 abc = response_var[response_var['code'] == 'ABC'].loc[:,rv[1]].to_numpy()
8 means_all = np.array([np.mean(a), np.mean(b), np.mean(ab), np.mean(c),
np.mean(ac), np.mean(bc), np.mean(abc)])↪→
9 total = np.array([one, a, b, ab, c, ac, bc, abc])
10 contrast_A = np.sum(-one + a - b + ab - c + ac - bc + abc)
11 contrast_B = np.sum(-one - a + b + ab - c - ac + bc + abc)
12 contrast_AB = np.sum(one - a - b + ab + c - ac - bc + abc)
13 contrast_C = np.sum(-one - a - b - ab + c + ac + bc + abc)
14 contrast_AC = np.sum(one - a + b - ab - c + ac - bc + abc)
15 contrast_BC = np.sum(one + a - b - ab - c - ac + bc + abc)
16 contrast_ABC= np.sum(-one+ a + b - ab + c - ac - bc + abc)
17 contrasts_all = np.array([contrast_A, contrast_B, contrast_AB, contrast_C,
contrast_AC, contrast_BC, contrast_ABC])↪→
18 ...
19 # Sum Squares
20 num_effects = np.power(2,k)-1
21 num_elements = num_effects+2
22 sum_squares = np.ones(num_elements) #All effects plus error and total
23 for i in range(num_effects):
24 sum_squares[i] = np.square(contrasts_all[i])/(n*np.power(2,k))
25 total_mean = np.mean(total)
26 SST = np.sum(np.square(total - total_mean))
27 SSE = SST - np.sum(sum_squares[0:num_effects])
28 sum_squares[num_effects] = SSE
29 sum_squares[num_effects+1] = SST
30
31 #Build datafile
32 for i in range(num_effects):
33 F0 = mean_squares[i]/MSE
34 f_vals[i] = F0
35 f_crits[i] = stats.f.ppf(1-alpha,DF[i],DF[num_effects])
36 p_vals[i] = 1 - stats.f.cdf(F0, DF[i],DF[num_effects])
37 effects[i] = contrasts_all[i]/(n*np.power(2,k-1))
38 means[i] = means_all[i]
39 anova_df_numpy = np.array([means, effects, sum_squares, DF, mean_squares, f_vals,
f_crits, p_vals])↪→
This script calculates contrasts, estimated effects, f-statistics and p-values for up
to five factors. Using this information it filters only the factors that had the desired
impact and returns them in an array to be re-evaluated at even stronger levels. Should
there not be any “statistically” significant effects (defined as a p-value less then the
chosen confidence level) but perhaps some strong performers with a “good” sample
mean the secondary mode is triggered and they are returned instead.
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3.2.1.2 Secondary Test
The secondary results analysis test is simply a “trial and error” mode that com-
pares sample means and continues testing until no further improvement is observed.
Improvement again is definable by the researcher as either a higher or lower mean
compared to the previous one. In addition due to development time, this “best mean”
heuristic mode is the default analysis used beyond the first iteration of the multi stage
optimization loop. Future work could easily modify the Python script to perform a
different kind of test or handle shrinking factor combinations to re-apply the ANOVA
test as appropriate.
Snippet 2 Sample from best-mean.py that determines if the re-run factors of a middle
loop beat the previous best. This function is only called on loops beyond the first
one
1 print("Re-run factor means")
2 print(response_var.groupby('code')[rv[1]].mean())
3
4 print("Lowest observed sample mean (target to beat)")
5 print(response_var.groupby('code')[rv[1]].mean().min())
6






9 improved_factors_bools = (response_var.groupby('code')[rv[1]].mean() <
target_to_beat).to_numpy() #boolean series↪→
10 all = ""
11 i=0
12 for y in candidiate_factors_index:
13 if improved_factors_bools[i]:
14 all = all + y + ","
15 i=i+1
16 print("Effects")
17 if len(all) == 0:




Of the many possible automation frameworks available, Ansible was chosen mainly
because of its use in Air Force cyber weapon systems [81], low overhead for deployment
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(no databases, agents, servers, or daemons) and ability to meet all of the design goals
mentioned previously [8]. The only thing required on the edge device is an operating
system, some form of transit like Secure Shell (SSH) and Python.
A single control workstation with the Ansible package installed is used to launch
all the commands, which are documented in human readable Yet Another Markup
Language (YAML) based “playbook” files. Inside the playbook file is a series of serial
tasks that run on either the remote devices or the control machine itself (shown in
Figure 13 below). A task is essentially a single call to one of the many possible
community supported modules which can be anything from a shell command, git
request, docker pull, cloud provider batch job, or firewall modification. While the
tasks are run in serial order from the file, each machine is issued the tasks in parallel.
This is particularly useful if trying to test a swarm of edge devices that must cooperate
together or when trying to reduce confounding factors like room ambient temperate
when a test started.
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Figure 13: Example of core Ansible files (the inventory and a YAML playbook) and
how it communicates with external devices
As with many of its class of tools, it allows an administrator or in this case a
researcher to carefully define every variable and step taken in a repeatable step by
step process. It also supports dynamic input and conditionals which can be captured
to provide a repeatable but evolving use case as seen later in Figure 14. Code snippet
3 demonstrates how conditional statements can apply to either certain devices or
broader environment conditions. The first two tasks make changes that only apply
to Raspberry Pi boards and the latter checks how much free memory each board has
so it can build an appropriate buffer size for libpcap.
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Snippet 3 Example of conditonal tasks in a playbook. The first two tasks make
changes that only apply to Raspberry Pi boards and the latter checks how much free
memory each board has so it can build an appropriate buffer size for libpcap
1 #When Disk I/O is very important. Also lifetime of flash...
2 - name: Disable swap on RPis
3 shell: swapoff -a
4 become: yes
5 when: "'nvidia' not in group_names"
6





12 when: "'nvidia' not in group_names"
13 become: yes
14
15 #If device has less then 2GB free,
16 #Take 70\% of it, mb to KiB
17 - name: Limit buffer_size for libpcap
18 set_fact:
19 buffer_size: "{{ 700 * ansible_facts['memory_mb']['nocache']['free']|int }}"
20 when: " ansible_facts['memory_mb']['nocache']['free'] < 2048"
21 changed_when: false
The next few subsections discuss Ansible’s input file structure and how it ties to
the larger picture.
3.2.2.1 Device Specific Variable Storage
The inventory file stores each device under test’s key variables and potential hard-
ware selections. While the example shown below is pre-built with variables that mat-
ter for a network test, just about anything can be stored in the key : value pair. This
file closely relates to vars.yml in section 3.2.2.2 but contains device specific entries.
Each machine is identified by its hostname which must either resolve via a Domain
Name Service (DNS) or a local hosts file. Following best practice, credentials for con-
necting to these devices are not stored here although they could be. This is discussed
later in the baselining section 3.2.2.5. The flexibility provided here allows devices of
different shapes and sizes to still be tested at the same time, or perhaps the same
type of device to be tested in varying ways.
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Snippet 4 An example of the inventory.yml file which contains the hostnames and






























3.2.2.2 Global Variable Storage
The vars file is the primary “one stop shop” file to tweak any of the global ex-
periment controls. As an important distinction, this file does not contain any tasks
but just key:value pairs that are referenced later in the static controls.yml and vari-
able controls.yml playbooks. Below in snippet 5 three main examples are highlighted.
Lines 2 to 5 are the primary setup variables used in the ANOVA portion of the experi-
ment. Lines 12, 13 are two global toggles for these particular system options and lines
17 and 20 are two of the potential optimization factors chosen for the experiment.
These global variables provide the backbone for experiment control and baselining
discussed in section 3.1.
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Snippet 5 An example of the vars.yml file which contains general, non device specific
variables for testing
1 ###Master variable file for all playbooks
2 total_factors: 5
3 total_combinations: 32 #2^5






10 #Large Receive / Generic Receive offload on/off.





16 #Receive Flow Steering (RFS) hash table size off / large
17 rfs_table: [ 0, 262144 ]
18 #Factor B
19 #Max Kernel Backlog default / large
20 backlog: [ 1000 , 65536 ]
3.2.2.3 Static Test Controls
As the name implies this playbook contains all actual tasks that ensure certain
options are set every single run of the test. The two examples shown in snippet 6
setup the appropriate capture interface (device unique, pulled from inventory.yml)
offload options (global, pulled from vars.yml). Generically speaking, any system level
configuration that can be influenced over a command line can be placed into this
playbook like disabling a service or tweaking a CPU fan response profile.
Snippet 6 Example of tasks from the static controls.yml playbook that are run every
new iteration of a test, ensuring a consistent baseline
1 - name: Set Receive Offloads
2 command: "ethtool -K {{ capture_interface }} lro {{ lro_status }} gro {{ gro_status }}"
3 become: yes
4
5 - name: Enable Capture Interface and Set Promiscuous
6 shell: |
7 ifconfig {{ capture_interface }} promisc
8 ifconfig {{ capture_interface }} up
9 become: yes
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3.2.2.4 Variable / Factor Test Controls
The variable control playbook is similar to the static playbook with the exception
that not every task runs every time. By utilizing the conditional task and loop
mechanism of Ansible the tasks will run only when their letter is detected in the
current loop/array variable “factor combos” (from vars.yml). Further exploiting this
loop functionality allows us to incrementally increase the value passed in subsequent
runs. A key aspect of this design is that these configuration changes do not persist
upon a reboot. This allows each new factor combination run a “clean slate” to work
from.
Snippet 7 Example of tasks from the variable controls.yml playbook that are only
run based on the current factors under test
1 ###FACTOR B###
2 - name: (Factor B) Set Kernel Max Backlog to {{backlog[1]|int*test_counter|int}}
3 shell: sysctl -w net.core.netdev_max_backlog={{backlog[1]|int*test_counter|int}}
4 become: yes




9 - name: (Factor D) Set Receive Flow Steering (RFS) Table Size to
{{rfs_table[1]|int*test_counter|int}}↪→
10 shell: |
11 sysctl -w net.core.rps_sock_flow_entries="{{ rfs_table[1]|int*test_counter|int
}}"↪→




15 when: "'D' in current_factor_list"
3.2.2.5 New Device Preparation and Baseline
As shown static and variable control playbooks is it trivial to apply changes re-
peatedly however for sake of time some of these only need applied or checked once.
These steps may include setting SSH keys, installing certain dependencies, copying
large datasets, compiling tests or creating directories. For repeatability sake it is im-
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portant to track these one-time changes, which is accomplished in prep-playbook.yml.
Examples of these tasks are provided in snippet 8.
Snippet 8 Example of tasks from the prep playbook.yml playbook that are only run
once per device. Ensures dependencies and other important settings like SSH keys
are set




5 key: "{{ lookup('file', '~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub') }}"
6 tags: auth
7
8 - name: Create Sensor Directory
9 file:
10 path: "{{ sensor_dir }}"
11 state: directory
12 owner: "{{ ansible_user }}"




17 - name: Install Prerequisites (may take awhile)
18 when: ansible_facts['os_family'] == "Debian"
19 apt:

















3.2.3 Multi-Stage Optimization Design
As highlighted in section 3.2.2 through the use of a few basic variables, loops
and conditionals Ansible provides an excellent way to implement a multi-stage 2k
full factorial optimization loop. Figure 14 visually represents this in the context
of Ansible. The output of this process is twofold, it not only provides a view of
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the performance of a given task at particular factor levels but also extrapolates the
most significant among them. The latter is important as it can become arduous and
subjective if the changing of a few settings is indeed helping or hindering performance.
A small quirk of Ansible is that the loop: keyword can only apply to one “task.”
Luckily there is a built in task that allows entire other playbooks to be inserted into
the current one, and the loop: keyword still applies. This workaround is shown in
snippet 9. As a consequence however a total of 4 YAML files are needed due to the
workflow containing essentially three loops. A traditional playbook makes up the first
file and calls the outer loop. The outermost loop is technically a recursive function
that performs the ANOVA/heuristic testing while the middle loop is for the current
factor combination (i.e. ABC) and the inner most loop for repeat or tests of the same
factor (i.e. ABC x5). Each one of these playbooks is laid on in the subsections that
follow.
Snippet 9 Example of introducing looping mechanic in Ansible. Used multiple times
as elaborated below
1 - name: Begin Primary Test Control
2 include_tasks: general-control.yml










This playbook is akin to the “main” function of any other program. It initially
calls the recursive outer loop general-benchmark-outerloop.yml. Upon its return, it
finalizes the results to file and displays them.
43
Figure 14: Automation workflow diagram for the multi stage optimization loop, with
context of Ansible input files and output files
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3.2.3.2 Outer Loop Playbook
The outermost loop begins by calling the middle loop with all possible 2k factors
after which the initial ANOVA test is performed for factor significance. It then
continuities to call the middle loop with a reduced sample space of either statistically
significant factors or best observed factors. The recursive base case checks if the
response variable has continued to improve and if not, terminates calling itself and
returns to main. Another quirk of Ansible (though likely by design) is that there is no
built in way to perform this sort of recursive call. By slightly abusing the exception
handler however we can “infinitely” recursively re-call the same playbook while still
maintaining the overall test counter. This is demonstrated in snippet 10.
Snippet 10 Recursive call of general-benchmark-outerloop.yml keeps calling itself to
perform tests if the previous middle loop’s test performed even better then the last
1 - name: Last Loop Results
2 debug:
3 msg: "Last Loop best was {{last_loop_best}}. Needs to beat {{target_to_beat}}. Was Iteration {{ test_counter }}"
4
5 - name: Check Last Loop Results
6 block:
7 - name: Check Recursive Base Case
8 fail:
9 #Maybe run a set number of times....
10 msg: "Continuing {{test_counter}} < 4"
11 when: "test_counter | int < 4"
12
13 #Or have a target
14 #msg: "Still room to improve {{last_loop_best}} < {{target_to_beat}}"
15 #when: "last_loop_best < target_to_beat"
16
17 rescue:
18 - name: Update Target to Beat
19 set_fact:
20 target_to_beat: "{{ last_loop_best }}"
21 loop_multiplier: "{{ test_counter|int**test_counter|int }}"
22
23 #Recursively call self to keep going
24 - name: Begin New Round
25 include_tasks: general-benchmark-outerloop.yml
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3.2.3.3 Middle Loop Playbook
This playbook acts as the “middle” loop of the overall process. It begins by
rebooting each device under test to revert the temporary changes of the last iteration.
Although not implemented in this version, reverting non-temporary changes could be
performed right after the reboot as well. After waiting for the reboot it applies the
next set of controls and begins the inner loop general-benchmark-innerloop.yml n
repeat times. The repeat tests increase the power of the 2k full factorial test. Upon
completion of all the repeat tests, a call to the analysis subprocess finds the latest
response variable’s best arithmetic mean and stores it for later comparison in the
recursive playbook.
3.2.3.4 Inner Loop Playbook
Lastly the “inner” loop is responsible for the actual workload task in question.
Prior to beginning the actual workload, an asynchronous call to the metric gathering
subprocess described in Section 3.2.3.5 begins collecting data on the device under test.
The actual workload itself can be anything from training a machine learning model to
a robotic control simulation. Upon completion of each test, the performance monitor
records it’s data which is copied back to the control workstation in an organized
fashion. The inclusion of all the failed when and ignore errors keys in this and other
files is to prevent the entire chain from collapsing should one process fail to run to
completion for whatever reason.
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Snippet 11 The middle loop playbook is implemented in general-benchmark-
middleloop.yml and is responsible to reset, reconfigure, and prepare for each indi-
vidual factor combination test and it’s repeats performed in the inner loop
1 #This playbook is the "middle" loop






7 #If any configuration changes are not undone with a reboot,
8 #add a playbook here to manually "revert" them
9
10 - name: Set Static Controls
11 include_tasks: general-static-controls.yml
12




17 - name: Begin Inner Loop
18 include_tasks: general-benchmark-innerloop.yml


















33 #if the last item in loop and not inital run




38 - name: Update Last Middle Loop Best
39 set_fact:





43 significant_factors_history: "{{significant_factors_history}} + [
'{{anova.stdout_lines[anova.stdout_lines|length -1]}}' ]"↪→
44 last_loop_best_history: "{{last_loop_best_history}} + [
'{{anova.stdout_lines[anova.stdout_lines|length -3]|int}}' ]"↪→
45 when: "ansible_loop.revindex == 1 and test_counter > 1"
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Snippet 12 The inner loop playbook implemented in general-benchmark-
innerloop.yml launches the actual desired workload and performance monitoring sub-
system. This is repeated however many times are desired to repeat tests
1 - name: Launch Performance Monitor (Factors {{ current_factor_list }})
2 shell: "./gather_stats.bash <<**PID**>> <<**SAMPLE RATE**>> {{ current_factor_list }}"
3 args:







11 # <<**YOUR WORKLOAD TASK(S) GOES HERE.....**>>
12 # SEE RATELIMIT TEST FOR EXAMPLE
13
14 - name: Stop Everything
15 shell: kill "$(cat gather.pid)"
16 args:





22 - name: Wait for Results








31 - name: Copy Results
32 fetch:
33 src: "{{experiment_dir}}/{{ inventory_hostname }}-results-verbose.csv"
34 dest: "results/{{ inventory_hostname }}-results-run{{test_counter}}-verbose.csv"
35 flat: yes
36 changed_when: false
3.2.3.5 Metric Gathering Subprocess
In order to collect the necessary performance metrics to perform any sort of anal-
ysis a method was needed to poll the necessary sensors and software counters. Since
many of the desired software counters were stored in the kernel’s proc file system
reading them straight from the command line was simple and efficient enough. Since
bash is the default shell for all the devices tested in Table 2 a shell script was writ-
ten to perform these collections. This comprehensive script was written to gather
the desired statistics per a set interval then perform some basic calculations like the
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arithmetic mean before cleanly terminating it’s results to a file. Table 5 displays the
currently supported collections which could easily be expanded in future work to in-
clude things like total runtime, input/output wait time, disk utilization or Graphics
Processing Unit (GPU) usage.
CPU PID%µ PID%max system%µ system%max
Memory (MB) PID%µ PID%max PIDmax system%min systemmin
Temperature (C) CPUµ CPUmax
Power (W) CPUµ CPUmax
Network (HW) rxppsµ rxppsmax nicdrop∑ nicdropµ nicdrop%
Network (SW) rxbpsµ rxbpsmax kerndrop∑ kerndropµ
Table 5: Supported Response Variables
Process ID (PID) is the identifier of the main workload processes (all threads)
where “system” is a conglomerate of the user (regular processes), system (kernel
threads), niced (high/low priority process), wa (IO waiting), hi (servicing hardware
interrupts) and si (servicing software interrupts) CPU timers. The power variable
currently depends on the board family. The Raspberry Pi boards do not have a
built in power senor so a power state is returned instead. The NVIDIA boards tested
support on-die power for the CPU, GPU and carrier board though the latter two were
omitted for development time. Since the script is launched in parallel from Ansible it
doesn’t necessarily know which board it landed on which matters for certain sensors.
Therefore as part of the startup sequence (snippet 13) it detects the proper device
family and adjusts accordingly.
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Snippet 13 The gather stats.bash subprocess automatically detects which device it
is running on to reference the correct sensors. This simplifies the Ansible task to a
single unified one instead of N devices unique ones
1 if [ $(sudo lshw -short -c system | awk 'FNR == 3 {print $2}') == 'Raspberry' ];
then DEVICE_FAM=pi;↪→
2 elif [ $(sudo lshw -short -c system | awk 'FNR == 3 {print $2}') == 'Jetson-TX1'
]; then DEVICE_FAM=nvidia-tx1;↪→
3 ...
4 if [ "$DEVICE_FAM" == 'pi' ]; then
5 TEMPERATURE_CPU[$LOOP_COUNT]=$(vcgencmd measure_temp | grep -ow
"[0-9][0-9].[0-9]")↪→
6 POWER_CPU[$LOOP_COUNT]=\$(expr $(vcgencmd measure_clock arm | grep -oP
"([0-9]+)" | tail -1)/1000000)↪→
7
8 elif [ "$DEVICE_FAM" == 'nvidia-tx1' ]; then
9 TEMPERATURE_CPU[$LOOP_COUNT]=$(bc <<< 'scale=1; '$(cat
/sys/devices/virtual/thermal/thermal_zone1/temp)'/1000')↪→
10 POWER_CPU[$LOOP_COUNT]=$(bc <<< 'scale=3; '$(cat
/sys/devices/7000c400.i2c/i2c-1/1-0040/iio_device/in_power0_input)'/1000')↪→
11
12 elif [ "$DEVICE_FAM" == 'nvidia-tx2' ]; then
13 TEMPERATURE_CPU[$LOOP_COUNT]=$(bc <<< 'scale=1; '$(cat
/sys/devices/virtual/thermal/thermal_zone1/temp)' / 1000')↪→
14 POWER_CPU[$LOOP_COUNT]=$(bc <<< 'scale=3; '$(cat
/sys/bus/i2c/drivers/ina3221x/0-0041/iio_device/in_power0_input)'/1000')↪→
Another key component of this script is to adapt to a heavily loaded system. Since
any of the “per second” samples are heavily reliant on a set interval the script will
keep track of the wall clock time between passes and factors it in when doing “per
second” calculations. This is demonstrated on line 16 in code block 14 below.
The bash time keyword returns the “wall clock” or “real” time spent in the sub-
shell contained within the brackets. Inside the brackets are a call to sleep and a
asynchronous call to captureLap which actually polls all the sensors. Meanwhile the
builtin wait holds execution of the main thread until the sleep has finished. The
resulting real time is returned and shuffled around with file descriptors before being
saved to a file for later reference.
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Snippet 14 Some samples obtained in gather stats.bash are timing dependant (“per
second”) so it uses some bash built in mechanisms to adjust for heavy load drift
1 captureLap{
2 ...







10 exec 3>&1 4>&2 #Preserve the original stdout/stderr
11 while [[ -d /proc/$PID ]]
12 do
13 #This needs to be as close as possible to SAMPLE_RATE sec for
14 #"per second" calculations to be accurate
15 #As system load nears 100% the loop will likely drift, so try to account for it.
16 { time { sleep $SAMPLE_RATE & captureLap 1>&3 2>&4; wait $!; } } 2>"$tmp/lastloop"
17 LOOP_TIME_REAL=$(cat $tmp/lastloop)
18 done
By default the sample interval is set to one second though it is adjustable. This
is based off a recommendation from NVIDIA as reading their internal sensors too
frequently will incur excessive amount of power consumption as it still utilizes internal
CPU resources [68].
In order to save development time some metrics like CPU usage and memory
were obtained from other processes like ps and top. Since these pre-built applications
already query the same built-in kernel data structures and counters, creating anything
custom would just be re-implementing an existing product. CPU utilization however
proved a little more elusive as the definition seems to flex based upon on the tool
used. the common ps command for example calculates things a little bit differently
then top (from ps man page):
CPU usage is currently expressed as the percentage of time spent running
during the entire lifetime of a process. This is not ideal, and it does not
conform to the standards that ps otherwise conforms to. CPU usage is
unlikely to add up to exactly 100%.
Whereas commands like top provide a more expected behavior with one caveat
that it must be running to begin calculating:
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%CPU – CPU Usage
The task’s share of the elapsed CPU time since the last screen update,
expressed as a percentage of total CPU time.
While future work could likely remove this subprocess altogether by manually
calculating the metric from /proc/pid/stat, a background top process provides the
core functionality needed.
At the end of each main loop, the results generated from the gather stats.bash
script are compiled and fed into the analysis process discussed earlier in Section
3.2.1. Using this information it selects the factors that had the best desired impact
and returns them in an array for Ansible to re-evaluate at even stronger levels. In
addition the rolling “target to beat” is established here. This best performing factor
result is fed into the next loop as the base case to continue or end the recursion. If
the next loop performs better then this score, increasing the factor levels even more
had a good impact. If the next loop performs worse, increasing the factor levels had
a detrimental affect and the entire workflow will end. Likewise If all the attempted
factors had a “bad” sample mean after the first test compared to the intersection or
“unoptimized” case, nothing is returned ending the entire process. Again the desire or
“good” and “bad” in this case is definable by the researcher by switching the greater
or less than operators.
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Figure 15: High level metric gathering script (gather-stats.bash) workflow diagram
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3.2.4 Limiting Factors
Unfortunately, some confounding factors such as power quality, ambient envi-
ronmental conditions, or engineering quality will be not controlled. The Raspberry
Pi family of boards are much more susceptible to these nuisance factors and begin
throttling rather early in some cases [69].
In addition the ANOVA test does not automatically implement any procedural
normality tests like Kolmogroov-Smirnov or Shapiro-Wilk. The normality was instead
validated with graphical methods like normplots and histograms as demonstrated in
Section 4.1.3.
3.3 Specific Application: Edge Network Sensors
We use the automated test framework described in Section 3.2 to execute three
end-to-end experiments. Each test consists of a unique network related workload
with a combination of unique and shared input variables across five different devices
from two hardware vendors. These selected applications not only show the validity
of the methodology but also help answer the trade-offs from miniaturizing traditional
intrusion sensor roles to edge devices. The first test is a hardware only test that
establishes the hardware limit of the Network Interface Card (NIC), a prerequisite
of sorts for the next two tests. If the NIC itself is failing to keep up with real-time
demand, then the application cannot be expected to perform any better.
The sensor roles selected for examination are raw traffic capturing with tcpdump
and signature based Intrusion Detection System (IDS) detection. Suricata is the par-
ticular IDS of choice for this test, chiefly due to its inclusion into the Air Force’s
Cyberspace Vulnerability Assessment / Hunter (CVA/H) network monitoring plat-
form but also for its ability to scale across CPU cores. The specifics for these tests




Figure 16 below outlines the overall end-to-end test architecture using devices
from Table 2. In order to properly simulate external network traffic being passed
to these devices an external generation source was needed. Luckily multiple open
source projects exist that can turn a moderately powered desktop workstation into a
10 gigabit traffic generator given the proper network interface. For purposes of this
test however a multi port 1 gigabit network adapter suited the need. Section 3.3.2
next discusses this further.
An “out-of-band” ad-hoc 802.11 network allows all of the single board computers
to create a mesh to communicate among themselves and the operator workstation.
Wireless chips based on this standard are ubiquitous in single board computers and
are usually part of the System on a Chip (SOC) die itself. While not specifically tested
in this research some interesting scenarios for leveraging a mesh network of sensors
like this is discussed in chapter V (Future Work). This out-of-band connection is
used to relay commands and reporting back to either an operator workstation or
larger collection server. This also allows the sensors to appear transparently on the
target network as only passive listeners, an important fact when hunting a Advanced
Persistent Threat (APT) or perhaps even when trying to get approval just to connect
it to a enterprise.
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Table 6: Software Versions Utilized in Testing
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3.3.2 Traffic Generation
Two open source projects provide the needed functionality to drive the traffic
generator (specs in table 7), netmap and tcpreplay. Netmap is a framework for very
fast packet Input / Output (I/O) from userspace applications. This is accomplished
via a a few steps, mainly intelligent I/O batching, a custom kernel module with
modified network interface drivers, and pre-allocated memory mapped buffers [83].
These techniques allow a researcher or developer to fully utilize modern links up to
40 gigbits per second. Driver support is a bit limited however, with only one non
Intel based chip supported (r8169 out of ixgbe, igb, i40e, e1000, e1000e). Regardless
this project has enabled commodity hardware to achieve something that had been






NIC & Driver 4x Intel igb (PCIe x16)
Distribution Ubuntu 18.04.3
Kernel linux 5.0.0.37
Table 7: Traffic Generator Hardware Specifications
tcpreplay is a project that is used for replaying and editing previously obtained
packet captures. It was originally designed to replay malicious traffic for tuning of IDS
but has evolved to providing background noise and simulating requests to things like
web servers. [84] It fully supports the netmap API as well which provides the much
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needed optimizations to get packets on the wire with as little meddling as possible
from the host kernel.
Multiple preexisting packet capture datasets exist so there was no need to generate
one. The Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity (CIC) has published a survey and
dataset of their own which contains a good blend of modern attacks on a fairly large
virtualized environment. These datasets also come with attack truth data that can
be used to validate results seen after replaying. [85]
3.3.3 Dataset Preparation
This particular dataset required some conditioning however before it could be
properly replayed over a live wire. When it was first captured, their sensor ma-
chine likely had Large Receive Offload (LRO) and/orGeneric Receive Offload (GRO)
enabled. These receive side optimizations buffer and automatically recombine seg-
mented packets on the network card instead of interrupting the CPU to handle each
one, thereby reducing overhead. These mega packets then get sent to the application
layer and saved in the packet capture as-is with packet sizes that are larger then the
Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU). For purposes of all testing in this work, the
MTU is set the Ethernet default of 1500 bytes.
The problem arises when attempting to replay captures with these gigantic pack-
ets which can be up to the size of the “IP total length” field (216 = 64k bytes).
The transmit side counterpart optimizations TCP Segmentation Offload (TSO) and
Generic Segmentation Offload (GSO) do the same thing in reverse for normal user
applications and could potentially handle the large payloads. The netmap driver by-
passes these optimizations however for finer tuned speed control meaning any packet
larger then the MTU gets dropped before transmission as it’s too big for the buffer
[86].
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The tcpreplay project includes other tools that can modify packet captures tem-
porarily or permanently . By using the tcprewrite tool in combination with the
fragroute engine it is possible to break any frames larger then the MTU into IP frag-
ments. The fragroute engine handles creating the appropriate headers and the result
is saved as a new ready to replay packet capture [87]
Figure 17: Example showing the same dataset packet before and after artificial seg-
mentation. The new capture now works in other tools properly
Pre-testing also verifies that this segmentation of the dataset has no impact on
signature based alerts, as shown below in Table 8










Table 8: CIC 2017 IDS Dataset alert rates before and after segmenting super jumbo
packets to properly fit in Ethernet MTU
3.3.4 Optimization Factor Selection
Since the goal of the proposed methodology is twofold; one to obtain a desired
metric of performance but also ensure fair use of the hardware it is important to select
appropriate optimization factors to try. By understanding the exact path a packet
takes upon arriving to a linux based device it becomes possible to hone in on possible
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bottlenecks. Below is a breakdown of the workflow from when a new packet arrives to
final delivery to the proper application. This is built from the perspective of a single
receive queue interface, which applies to all single board computers tested in Table
2. Multiple queue interfaces exist mainly on enterprise servers and can essentially
implement the workflow (# of queue) parallel times. New API (NAPI) was added to
the kernel around version 2.6 as new method of reducing expensive hardware inter-
rupts by combining their asynchronous requests with a period of scheduling friendly
polling.
1. Frame is received by the network adapter
2. Frame is moved (via Direct Memory Access (DMA)) to a RX ring buffer in
kernel memory
3. The NIC notifies the system of that there is a new frame ready for processing
by raising a hardware Interrupt Request (IRQ)
4. The hard IRQ is cleared and the pending data is scheduled to be moved with
NAPI software based IRQ
5. The kernel executes NAPI driver code which drains the RX ring via “software
IRQ”
6. The software IRQ place the frames into a kernel data structure called a “skb”
(socket buffer)
7. (if enabled) Receive Flow Steering (RFS) hashes the incoming traffic to keep
similar flows together for cache coherency
8. (if enabled) Receive Packet Steering (RPS) selects and bins traffic to a CPU for
further processing.
9. (if enabled) cores keep each other active via Inter-Processor Interrupt (IPI)
preventing backlogs from piling up
10. Each backlog queue decodes new frames into appropriate protocol buffer. Op-
tionally delivers raw bytes to packet tapping software
11. Applications expecting traffic are notified and they read packets from kernel
memory via syscall
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Figure 18 below is a workflow diagram showing each step just mentioned. This
figure will be important and referenced many times in Chapter IV specific test factor
selections.
Since the fundamental unit to the kernel is a “packet”, regardless of it’s payload
size the primary network generation control measure is chosen as Packets Per Second
(PPS). For purposes of this experiment, all links considered will be gigabit Ethernet
(1000BASE-T) based. This is due to it being the de-facto supported link in all
the boards tested and availability of external hardware. Considering this and the
minimum overhead required to send a packet (shown in figure 19) the maximum
packet rate and thus ultimately the interrupt rate is:
1, 000, 000, 000 bits/sec
(84 bytes ∗ 8 bits/byte)
= 1, 488, 096 Packets Per Second (PPS) (8)
Figure 19: Range of possible Ethernet frame sizes and associated overhead [90]
While limiting the packet size to the absolute minimum is possible via Netmap
this does not simulate realistic traffic, except in perhaps flood or denial of service type
attacks which are outside the scope of this research. The average packet size seen by
The Center for Applied Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA), an organization dedicated
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Figure 18: Recieve packet flow through the linux kernel, post NAPI implementation
(2.6+) [88] [89]
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to conducting network and infrastructure research, is anywhere from 750-900 bytes.
They obtain their data via multiple passive taps on large Internet backbone sites [91].
One such observation event shown in Figure 20 in early 2019 saw 2.5 billion packets
in an hour with a mean IPv4 packet size of 891. According to CAIDA, IPv6 still only
accounts for about 11% of the traffic and will not be considered at this time [91].
Figure 20: NYC Internet Backbone on 2019-01-17. 1 Hour of observed packet lengths
[91]
Using netmap to generate a sample of 10 million random packets, the average
packet length ends up around 783 bytes. While its distribution of sizes is less then
desirable as it heavily favors packets sized between 640 - 1279 (figure 21), the CIC
dataset suffers from a similar problem with an average of 890 bytes per packet favoring
sizes 40-79 (mostly TCP ACKs) and 1280+ (mostly fragmented continuations) [85].
Regardless, all of these observations are inline with previous research showing real
world interarrival times and burst lengths for Internet / Ethernet [92] and application
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traffic (e.g. WWw and FTP) [93] behave as fractal and self-similar, failing to fit
traditional “normal-like” distributions like Poisson. Regardless the robust analysis
method described in Section 3.2.1 should be able to handle this potential adversity.
Figure 21: Test traffic packet length distribution, randomly generated versus CIC
dataset
Considering all the above the goal is to fully saturate the gigabit based interface
with reasonable packets, the following “perfect transmission” calculation yields an
upper limit of the physical medium itself that will be used in further testing [90].
1, 000, 000, 000 bits/sec
(783 bytes ∗ 8 bits/byte)
= 159, 624PPS (9)
The traffic generation machine has a few other input variables of its own. Since
the modified netmap driver is interfacing directly with the hardware to send packets
at line speeds, it does not interface well with typical kernel optimizations. This means
disabling GSO, TSO, and TX checksum offloading as leaving them on may lead to
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“dropped” TX packets. [86] In addition, speed throttling mechanisms like Ethernet
pause frames (IEEE 802.3x) must be disabled to prevent the sending side from slowing
down despite the congestion. Lastly as discussed earlier in section 3.3.4 the initial
PPS is also set at 160,000.
Snippet 15 The traffic generator machine is shared with the Ansible host, which can
perform actions on itself. These “Local actions” are re-performed for good measure
at the begging of each middle loop in tandem with the other static re-configurations
in general-static-controls.yml
1 - name: Disable Flow Control On Send Interface
2 local_action:
3 module: shell




8 failed_when: "'Cannot' in local_result.stderr"
9
10 - name: Disable Offloads on Send Interface
11 local_action:
12 module: shell




In summary, this chapter introduced and discussed a general methodology that
utilizes a robust 2k Full Factorial design to optimize and benchmark various workloads
for various edge type single board computers. Furthermore a specific use case is
prepared to evaluate five different commodity device’s performance with respect to
three network monitoring applications. Next in Chapter IV the specific results are
presented and discussed in detail.
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IV. Results and Analysis
4.1 Methodology Validation
Examining select results from the three network monitoring tests it is possible
to validate the three main design points detailed in Chapter III. The full network
monitoring optimization factor selection, results, and analysis is provided in Section
4.2. An annotated guide on the layout of all the results figures in this chapter is
available in Appendix A.
4.1.1 Automation Validation
The automation design was driven by the fact edge devices come in a wide array
of capability and cost. In other words, it needed to be easy to use, modify, and scale
as appropriate. It also needed to be repeatable and support a consistent baseline.
While proving something is ”easy” is not very straightforward, a few qualitative
observations were taken. Figure 22 below shows approximately the amount of unique
lines (including white space) each test performed contains. In all three cases the
amount of reusable code is 90% or greater. It only took 142 lines on average to
swap the workload, all the variables, and a few housekeeping items. This does not
even factor in the very generous use of newlines in the human readable Yet Another
Markup Language (YAML) playbooks (i.e. a lot of lines only have two words on them
like become: yes or ignore_errors: yes)
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Figure 22: Breakdown of unique lines of code per test. Highlights the ease of swapping
in different test workloads
The nature of how Ansible works handles the scale and repeatability dilemma,
since the tool is typically used in large data centers or cloud environments where the
entire enterprise could almost be ephemeral [8]. Likewise with every single step taken
documented in a playbook the baseline is predictable. Figure 23 below highlights how
many individual tests were run when building all the results seen later in this chapter.
Each ”replicate” in this included fully starting, stopping and recording the result of
whatever workload was being tested and each device ran in parallel. While this
particular number of tests (almost 9,000) may or may not be impressive, a scenario
with say 10 devices testing in parallel would increase the number of tests completed
to almost 18,000 in the same time frame.
4.1.2 Multi-Stage Optimization Validation
The Suricata test showed the most clear evidence of the optimization process
working since in all test cases each device dropped a substantial amount of traffic
initially. Using one such result as an example, in Figure 24 below the TX2 was
observed initially dropping 7.3 million packets out of the 14.1 million (51%) it was
sent. After the first optimization pass this was reduced to only 4.4M, a 41% reduction.
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Figure 23: Demonstrates how many individual tests were run when building all the
results in Chapter IV. Highlights the automation portion of the implementation works
well
A second and third pass both saw another 10% reduction to 4M and 3.6M respectively.
The process came to an end after the fourth attempt saw no further improvement.
In the end this test saw almost a 50% improvement of the devices ability to handle
the dataset traffic, going from 7.3M packets dropped to only 3.6M. A similar result
was seen in the other devices tested as well, full details of which are available in
Section 4.2.3.2 with factor discussion and further test details in Section 4.2.3.
68
Figure 24: The optimization portion of the Suricata test is observed selecting the
best runmode (A) and Max Pending Packets (B) after multiple iterations. The per-
formance trend line shows the progression of optimization from start to finish
Similarly the packet capture initial unoptimized scores had a large sum of dropped
packets. Figure 25 shows the TX1 dropped 1.7 million packets out of 3.3 million
( 51%) and the XAVIER dropped 41,910 out of 4.8 million ( 1%). After the first
iteration of optimization the amount of dropped packets reduced to zero for the
XAVIER but remained at 42% for the TX1. Since the TX1 still had remaining
memory not being used, a second and third iteration of the loop continued on this
device and found the optimal buffer size to reduce drops to zero. The final result stored
for each individual device was its maximum sustained Packets Per Second (PPS) at
this optimal buffer configuration. The full discussion of this test is in Section 4.2.2
with results available in Section 4.2.2.2.
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Figure 25: The optimization portion of the packet capture test found the optimal
libpcap buffer size after multiple iterations without over-sizing. The performance
trend line shows the progression of optimization from start to finish
4.1.3 Analysis Validation
While the analysis process working is almost implied when discussing the optimiza-
tion results, a deeper look reinforces the confidence that the process as implemented
will be able to handle diverse situations. Most of the gray area resides when he as-
sumption of normality is violated and the backup analysis is triggered. As discussed
in Section 3.2.1.2 this test can be reduced to a simple “trial and error” approach to
optimization.
For example, with the introduction of the Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity
(CIC) traffic dataset the lack of randomness seen from the traffic generator begins
to influence and break down the normality assumptions of the network based tests.
Figure 26 below shows the graphical normality for the XAVIER’s interface rate test.
While not perfect, the random packet generation of netmap as discussed in 3.3.2
supports an argument for normality.
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(a) Histogram, Q-Q Plot (b) Normplot of Effects
Figure 26: XAVIER Interface Normality Tests. The network traffic was randomly
generated, and part of this is shown through in the response variable nearly fitting
the model lines
Figure 27 afterward shows the graphical normality tests for the XAVIER’s Suricata
test. The response variable fails to fit the assumption model, likely due to a break
down when switching from randomly generated traffic to repeatable dataset traffic.
This will ultimately manifest itself as either a Type I (false positive) or Type II (false
negative) error.
(a) Histogram, Q-Q Plot (b) Normplot of Effects
Figure 27: XAVIER Suricata Normality Tests. The Dataset packet captures were
replayed, and thus the response variable poorly fit the normality model
While the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) test is still ran after the end of the
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first optimization loop, it’s accuracy is questionable when observing the estimated
effects seen in the XAVIER Suricata result (Figure 28). Factor combination AB had
the lowest sample mean but had an erroneous positive estimated effect. This type of
behavior is evident on the other replayed traffic test results as well. Despite this, the
result of the ANOVA was still recorded and the backup mode took over identifying
the good impact AB had regardless.
Figure 28: Caption
Validating the analysis process itself is more straightforward. The actual Python
code implemented in anova.py was validated as accurate by comparing the output
between it and some professional software. Additionally we can observe it working as
intended in the result of the TX1 packet capture test shown in Figure 29. Pretesting
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had shown that only increasing the libpcap buffer size (Factor A) would greatly reduce
the amount of traffic dropped by all the devices. The ANOVA process successfully
identified this lone single factor as significant and did not erroneously also select the
combinations that had it (e.g AB, AC) even though they too showed a significant
boost. The full results of this and similar tests are in Section 4.2.2.2.
Figure 29: The ANOVA process successfully identified Factor A as the only signif-
icant factor of the TX1 packet capture test and did not erroneously also select the
combinations that had it (e.g AB, AC) even though they too showed a significant
boost
4.2 Network Monitoring Results
4.2.1 Interface Ratelimit Test
The first and perhaps most important test of the hardware is the interface ratelimit
test. Generally speaking, this test establishes how well the Network Interface Card
(NIC) and Central Processing Unit (CPU) packages balance the load of oncoming
network traffic. Specifically speaking, this test establishes a macro benchmark of how
well the CPU handles interrupts from the NIC and further processes incoming bytes
to their destination.
Since the rate of incoming traffic to a network sensor is out of its control, it is
not unusual for more packets to arrive then can be processed. If at any point the
network interface driver is filling its circular RX buffer faster then it can be emptied,
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information will be lost as an “interface drop.” The goal of this test is to establish
the maximum rate packets can arrive (PPS limit) and highlight which parts of the
processing pipeline can be optimized to reduce interface drops.
4.2.1.1 Selected Factors
Reexamining the workflow shown in figure 18, there was an assortment of possible
variables to tune. Some of them were simple on/off toggles (like enabling Receive
Packet Steering (RPS) and others were a scaling window (like backlog queue size)
at various points in the path. Based upon suggested tuning in the Suricata official
documentation [47], High speed vendor recommendations [94] [95], the Linux kernel
documentation [96], and other privately funded research [89] the following factors
were chosen initially.
Static Controls
Disabling Large Receive Offload (LRO) and Generic Receive Offload (GRO) on the
sensors not only prevents the capture issues seen in section 3.3.2, but is recommended
by the official Suricata documentation. The auto combination of similar traffic while
fine for typical end clients strips off too much metadata for certain signatures to work
properly [47]. While these changes are not necessarily required for the ratelimit test,
making them here will provide a better foundation for future tests.
In addition, early tests had shown that multi receive queue interfaces like the
Broadcom tg3 performed poorly compared to their single queue counterparts like the
Intel e1000e. This is likely due to a hardware limitation of the interrupt handler
on ARM boards [97]. Since each queue has its own IRQ handler, most modern x86
multi processor systems have an advanced programmable interrupt controllers like IO-
APIC that allow each one to be “re-mapped” to different cores. For the tested ARM
based boards, the more limited interrupt handlers used like GICv2 lack any method
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of remapping to different cores, meaning all interrupts will be bound to the CPU
core that booted the system, usually CPU0 [98] [97]. Thus a multi queue interface
ends up with multiple hard IRQs all mapped to the same core setting the stage for
an interrupt storm. By forcing the number of active queues in the driver to 1 this
scenario can be avoided.
Another option is enabling RPS which attempts to load balance incoming traffic
processing on a multi core system once the driver has fully delivered it to a Socket
Buffer (skb) (item 7 in figure). This is accomplished by a hashing and sorting al-
gorithm that determines which CPU should process the data. Each core then keeps
the other informed via a Inter-Processor Interrupt (IPI) that new bytes have arrived
for processing. [96] RPS is disabled by default and can be enabled on a per CPU
basis with a bitmask. The official recommendation is to enable it on every core not
handling hardware interrupts [96] [94] which as seen above is CPU0. Three of the
devices under test have four cores, which leads to a bit mask of 0xE (1110) where
CPU0 is the least significant bit. The TX2 has six and the Xavier has eight cores
however requiring two more unique masks (0x3E & 0xFE respectively). A simple
entry in the inventory can account for each devices unique definition of what “high”





5 rps_mask: 3E #0011 1110 (6 cpu total, CPU0 handling IRQ)
Surprisingly, initial tests had shown (in Figure 30 below) RPS very positively
affected the NVIDIA boards while it quite negatively affected the RPi boards. Upon
further investigation this is likely due to the overhead associated with calculating the
hash needed to load balance traffic across multiple cores. This overhead was seen
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early on as a problem after RPS was introduced, so some vendors began to offload
this calculation to the hardware. [99] The RPi boards built-in Ethernet port comes
with rather limited drivers and lack this capability where the Intel external cards on
the TX1 and TX2 do not. The Xavier is using it’s built in port but is fast enough
the effect is not seen. With these stark contrasts RPS was selectively enabled as a
static control where it made sense.
As another important initial test, the Rx Ring buffer is also scalable on some
devices. Despite recommendations from enterprise vendors like Red Hat [100] and
Mellanox [95] another initial test (also shown in Figure 30 below) showed increasing
the Rx Ring size made a very large negative impact on the two supported devices.
It is speculated this is related to a mismatch created between the hardware buffer
and the CPU cache sizes. While this memory resides in the kernel itself the ability
to control it is limited by the NIC and its driver [89]. The two Intel drivers tested
(igb, e1000e) support it but the integrated drivers (eqos, lan78xx and bcmgenet) did
not. Future work could retry this test to seek out a potential ”sweet spot” for these
buffers but it was ultimately removed due to only 2 of 5 devices supporting it.
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Figure 30: An initial interface test showed disparity the effect enabling RPS had, in
addition to the negative impact of RX-Ring resizing
Lastly in order to observe the peak performance of these devices a few unique
toggles to ensure they are in “full power” mode. As an important distinction, these
are not overclocking anything beyond factory specifications but rather removing fac-
tory power saving defaults. For the Raspberry Pi3B+, increasing the temp soft limit
increases the time it’s CPU runs at full clock before dialing back to prevent over-
heating. The hard limit is 85 C and this value could likely be tested even higher
by a bold researcher [69]. (The RPi4 boards currently do not implement any similar
system) The NVIDIA boards have a more rigid power profile definition that tightly
controls the power consumption. It does this by toggling entire cores and subsystems
on and off while limiting clocks substantially. The “MAXN” mode ensures all cores
are online and at maximum frequency [70]. Other primary modes include a 10W,
15W, and 30W power cap with various sub modes that enable or disable things like
Vision Accelerators and Deep Learning Accelerators.
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1 - name: Set Receive Offloads
2 command: "ethtool -K {{ capture_interface }} lro {{ lro_status }} gro {{ gro_status }}"
3 become: yes
4
5 #Multiple rx queues dont make much sense on small boards where the IRQs cant be remapped
6 #the SMP affinity for all of them hits the same core, making it worse
7 - name: Limit Number of Hardware Queues




12 failed_when: "'Invalid argument' in queues_result.stderr"
13





19 when: "'nvidia' not in group_names"
20 become: yes
21
22 - name: Set MAXN Power Profile on NVIDIA Boards
23 shell: |
24 nvpmodel -m 0
25 jetson_clocks
26 become: yes
27 when: "'nvidia' in group_names"
Variable Controls
Five unique variable factors were chosen for this test and are detailed below.
Factor A: New API (NAPI) Budget
The NAPI budget determines how much processing time can be spent among all
the device driver polling structures, where each interface and each queue (rx/tx) is
considered a structure. The driver poll is typically responsible for draining the RX
ring and moving the received bytes further into kernel memory, into a struct called
a skb. (Item 5 on figure) Increasing this may only prevent drops on a multi-queue
system but may also prevent the sensing interface from hogging all the available
“network related” CPU time from other non-sensing interfaces. [89]
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1 ###FACTOR A###
2 #Default 300 / Test Level 1200
3 - name: (Factor A) Increase NAPI Budget to {{NAPI_budget[1]|int * loop_multiplier}}
4 shell: sysctl -w net.core.netdev_budget={{NAPI_budget[1]|int * loop_multiplier}}
5 become: yes
6 when: "'A' in current_factor_list"
Factor B: Max Kernel Backlog (Pending Packets)
The Max Kernel Backlog (item 8 in figure) is simply how many packets can be backed
up waiting on a CPU. The larger the number, the more tolerance for latency is implied
in exchange for throughput as some packets may be waiting awhile [89] [95].
1 ###FACTOR B###
2 #Default 1000, test level 262144
3 - name: (Factor B) Set Kernel Max Backlog to {{backlog[1]|int * loop_multiplier|int}}
4 shell: sysctl -w net.core.netdev_max_backlog={{backlog[1]|int * loop_multiplier|int}}
5 become: yes
6 when: "'B' in current_factor_list"
Factor C: Socket Receive Buffer Size
The last stop in the kernel processing of packets is the appropriate application layer
protocol queue. (Item 9 in Figure 18) Here packets await an application to consume
them. For purposes of the interface rate test these packets have no consuming appli-
cation, however if they fit into a queue at this point they are no longer considered a
“drop.”
1 ###FACTOR C###
2 - name: (Factor C) Set Socket Recieve Max Buffer Size to {{rmem_max[1]|int *
loop_multiplier|int}}↪→
3 shell: sysctl -w net.core.rmem_max={{rmem_max[1]|int * loop_multiplier|int}}
4 become: yes
5 ignore_errors: yes
6 when: "'C' in current_factor_list"
Factor D: Receive Flow Steering
Receive Flow Steering (RFS) (item 6) is used in conjunction with RPS and helps
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solve some data locality issues by steering kernel processing of packets to the CPU
where the application thread consuming the packet is running, thus increasing cache
hit rates [89] [96]. This process has two main control variables, the size of the hash
table that tracks all the individual socket flows and how many flows are tracked per
receive queue. For a single queue system, it’s recommended they be the same value.
In this test, since there is no process actually consuming packets it is unlikely to
make an impact. The socket flow table is informed by recvmsg and sendmsg system
calls from a userspace application and in the absence of any of these, RFS will fall
back to plain RPS [96].
1 ###FACTOR D###
2 Default off / Test level 32768 (for both)
3 - name: (Factor D) Set Receive Flow Steering (RFS) Table Size to
{{rfs_table[1]|int * loop_multiplier|int}}↪→
4 shell: |
5 sysctl -w net.core.rps_sock_flow_entries="{{ rfs_table[1]|int *
loop_multiplier|int }}"↪→




9 when: "'D' in current_factor_list"
Factor E: NAPI Weight
The NAPI weight adjusts how much time (out of budget set in Factor A above) can
be spent in the “backlog” phase of packet processing (item 9 in Figure 18). Not to
be confused with the driver poll, which happens earlier and should have a hard coded
weight of 64. This poll takes packets out of a per CPU queue and determines which
protocol handler it belongs in. If RPS is enabled each CPU has it’s own queue to




2 - name: (Factor E) Set Backlog Loop Weight to
{{backlog_weight|int*loop_multiplier|int}}↪→
3 shell: sysctl -w net.core.dev_weight={{backlog_weight|int*loop_multiplier|int}}
4 become: yes
5 ignore_errors: yes
6 when: "'E' in current_factor_list"
4.2.1.2 Test Results
The TX1 (Figure 32) saw negligible optimization gains (4%). This is likely due to
saturation of the single CPU core responsible for servicing network interrupts. The
TX2 (Figure 33) saw a 13% decrease in dropped packets by increasing backlog poll
weight (E) to 1,200, but this was a diminishing return and setting any higher caused
this boost to regress. Like the TX1, the CPU core handling the NIC interrupt was
completely saturated. This is shown in Figure 31
Figure 31: The TX1 and TX2 CPU responsible for NIC interrupts was near 100% for
the interface test
The XAVIER (Figure 34) and RPi4 (Figure 36) devices appear to lack any signifi-
cant bottleneck as their unoptimized sample means were 194 and 33 packets dropped
per second respectively. At the line rate of 160k PPS this equates to a negligible
0.0012% and 0.0002% of the traffic being missed. The Xavier did further improve this
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to 127 packets dropped by increasing the kernel backlog (B) and RFS table size(D).
The RPi3b+ saw a small but statistically significant 2.2% reduction in dropped pack-
ets with factor combo BC (Figure 35). Further improvements beyond this are unlikely
due to the Ethernet riding over the 480 mbps USB 2.0 bus which has a theoretical
max of 76k PPS at the generated traffic avg size:
480, 000, 000 bits/sec
(783 bytes ∗ 8 bits/byte)
= 76, 628 pps (10)
Overall, for the TX1 and TX2 the bottleneck seems to remain at bottom half of
softIRQ polling loop (item 4 in Figure 18). Only the top half is load balanced across
the cores with RPS and RFS. Adding more receive queues will not help either as the
ARM IRQ handler will still only map to one core [97]. Overclocking the CPU would
likely further reduce these drops but was outside the scope of research.
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Figure 32: The TX1 saw negligible optimization gains (4%). This is likely due to
saturation of the single CPU core responsible for servicing network interrupts
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Figure 33: The TX2 saw a 13% decrease in dropped packets by increasing backlog
poll weight (E) to 1,200, but this was a diminishing return and setting any higher
caused this boost to regress. Like the TX1, the CPU core handling the NIC interrupt
was completely saturated
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Figure 34: The Xaiver appears to lack any significant bottleneck as its unoptimized
sample mean was 194. At the line rate of 160k PPS this equates to a negligible
0.0012% of the traffic being missed. The Xavier did further improve to 127 packets
dropped by increasing the kernel backlog (B) and RFS table size(D)
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Figure 35: The RPi3b+ saw a small but statistically significant 2.2% reduction in
dropped packets with factor combo BC (Figure 35). Further improvements beyond
this are unlikely due to the Ethernet riding over the 480 mbps USB 2.0 bus
86
Figure 36: The RPi4 appears to lack any significant bottleneck as its unoptimized
sample means was 33 packets dropped per second. At the line rate of 160k PPS this
equates to a negligible 0.0002% of the traffic being missed.
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4.2.2 Traffic Capture Ratelimit Test
Traffic capture is in a sense the most raw and fundamental tool when it comes to
network monitoring. As discussed in Chapter 2, other more sophisticated tools come
with a larger overhead and can easily fail to keep up at network burst speeds [101].
With a machine capable of capturing 100% of the traffic passed to it, those bursts can
be queued and replayed or ingested at a later, quieter time. If a packet is missed in
the initial capture, there are no second chances and any potential proof or indicator
held in that instantaneous moment is gone.
4.2.2.1 Selected Factors
Despite the lower overhead of simply writing packets to disk, keeping up with
line speeds largely depends on the medium to which it is being written or stored
[46]. For purposes of this test, only the “on board” storage will be considered as a
destination since external drives carry too many variables and may be impractical in
large scale deployments. As an example writing to a traditional spinning HDD can
be influenced by things like spinning speed, cache size, platter density, fragmentation,
controller load and bus connection type. The NVIDIA boards tested all utilize a built
in eMMC 5.1 based flash storage [102] while the RPi leverage similar but considerably
slower SDHC flash storage [103]. Since the bottleneck of this test is predictably going
to be storage, a few simple tests will help better inform expectations. A “raw”
maximum write speed test can be performed with the command:
dd if=/dev/zero of=disktest.img bs=1G count=1 oflag=dsync
Where 1GB of zeros is forced to be physically written (no caching) to the current
directory. The result of this preliminary test is listed in Table 9 below which is then
used in the consideration of further factors.
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TX1 TX2 XAVIER RP3B+ RPi4
Technology eMMC eMMC eMMC SDHC SDHC
Class 5.1 5.1 5.1 UHS-I UHS-III
Theoretical Write Speeds 125 MB/s 125 MB/s 125 MB/s 10 MB/s 30 MB/s
Observed (3 sample avg) 60 MB/s 99 MB/s 110 MB/s 15 MB/s 23 MB/s
Table 9: Storage Speed Observations
Static Controls
Since disk I/O is very precious for this test, swap was disabled to help prevent unex-
pected writes. This is especially important for the devices with lower RAM like the
RPis, since buffer sizes are likely to balloon to near RAM capacity the swap would
likely become active. In addition, since the interface PPS rate was inherited from
the first test, carrying over any positive configurations is important. These values are
now implemented statically with varying levels as defined in the inventory.yml file.
1 #When Disk I/O is very important. Also lifetime of flash...
2 - name: Disable Swap
3 shell: swapoff -a
4 become: yes
5
6 ### VALUES INHERITED FROM PREVIOUS TEST###
7 #Former Factor A from interface test
8 - name: Increase NAPI Budget to {{NAPI_budget_best}}
9 shell: sysctl -w net.core.netdev_budget={{NAPI_budget_best}}
10 become: yes
11
12 #Former Factor B from interface test
13 - name: Set Kernel Max Backlog to {{backlog_best}}
14 shell: sysctl -w net.core.netdev_max_backlog={{backlog_best}}
15 become: yes
16
17 - name: Enable / Set Receive Packet Steering Affinity with Mask {{ rps_mask }}





Utilizing the interface PPS results from the previous test it is possible to observe the
maximum data rate that would be expected of the underlying storage. As shown in
the last row of Table 10 below, each device is projected to develop a deficit of packets
waiting to be written to disk. At this point the packet will either get dropped because
of a full CPU backlog or a full socket queue (items 8 and 9 in Figure 18 respectively).
Packets waiting in the socket queue for consumption (in this case by tcpdump via
libpcap) must move to one last buffer in userspace memory after which point they are
“guaranteed” to be handled eventually. This leads to three variable factors which are
detailed below.
TX1 TX2 XAVIER RP3B+ RPi4
Interface PPS 109k 149k 160k 70k 160k
Packet Size Avg 780 bytes
Expected bitrate (Mbps) 680 920 998 430 998
Expected Datarate (MB/s) 85 115 125 54 125
Expected Datarate vs.
Observed Storage Speed
-25 MB/s -16 MB/s -15 MB/s -39 MB/s -102 MB/s
Table 10: Storage Demand Observations
Factor A: Libpcap Buffer Size
Thus expanding the libpcap userspace buffer size in Factor A may buy enough time
for larger disk I/O requests to complete during periods of calmer, smaller packet
sizes in the generated sample. Factors B (Protocol / Socket Buffer), C (Backlog Poll
Weight), and D (RFS Table Size) are repeats from the interface test. They may play
a larger role in this test now that an application is actually consuming packets. Line
8-11 in the snippet below leverages the “facts” subsystem in Ansible to ensure the
desired buffer isn’t more then the available memory. Line 16-19 likewise ensures the
desired buffer size is not larger then what the library supports.
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1 ###FACTOR A###
2 - name: (Factor A) Set libpcap Buffer Size to
{{libpcap_buffer|int*loop_multiplier|int}}↪→
3 set_fact: #Stored as KiB
4 libpcap_buffer_size: "{{ libpcap_buffer|int * loop_multiplier|int }}"
5 when: "'A' in current_factor_list"
6
7 #Limit based on available
8 #1000 MB = 976563 KiB
9 - name: (Factor A) Cap Oversized Buffer for Hardware
10 set_fact:
11 libpcap_buffer_size: "{{ 900 *
ansible_facts['memory_mb']['nocache']['free']|int }}"↪→
12 when: "libpcap_buffer_size | int > 977 *
ansible_facts['memory_mb']['nocache']['free']|int"↪→
13
14 #libpcap uses a 32 bit (signed?) int
15 #https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/libpcap/issues/651
16 #2048 MB = 2000000 KiB
17 - name: (Factor A) Cap Oversized Buffer for Software
18 set_fact:
19 libpcap_buffer_size: "2000000"
20 when: "libpcap_buffer_size | int > 2000000"
Factor B: Socket Queue Size
This factor is a repeat form the interface ratelimit test. Now that there is an appli-
cation actually consuming packets, it may make a larger appearance.
Factor C: Backlog Poll Weight
This factor is a repeat form the Interface Ratelimit test. Likewise, this factor didn’t
have as big of an impact as expected in the interface test. Repeating it here may
show otherwise.
Note: Originally this test had a fourth factor (RFS Table Size) which was inherited
form the previous test. Later re-evaluations removed this factor with the exception
of the RPi3b+ which was performed with all 4.
Factor D: RFS Table Size
This factor is a repeat form the interface ratelimit test. Now that there is an appli-
cation actually consuming packets and informing the hashing algorithm which cache
is hot or not for a given flow, a larger presence should be felt then previous.
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4.2.2.2 Test Results
Somewhat predictably, increasing the libpcap buffer size (A) made a significant
difference in all five tests, dropping the packets lost to zero on all three NVIDIA
boards (Figures 37,38,39). The TX1 required a buffer size of 2GB before zero packets
were lost, while the faster disk speed of the TX2 and XAVIER were able to keep up
with only a 256 MB buffer.
The RPi3B+ (Figure 40) saw a 51% reduction in lost packets with a 512MB buffer.
Despite having 1GB of ram, increasing the buffer any larger then this caused kernel
instability. The RPi4’s (Figure 41) most significant factor was also A, however when
attempting to use any buffer larger then 256MB caused a kernel panic. It is unclear
if the driver or other part of the software was responsible as no log is generated and
the device becomes completely unresponsive (black screen).
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Figure 37: The TX1 required a buffer size of 2GB before zero packets were lost
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Figure 38: The TX2 was able to keep up with only a 256 MB buffer
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Figure 39: The XAVIER was able to keep up with only a 256 MB buffer
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Figure 40: The RPi3B+ saw a 51% reduction in lost packets with a 512MB buffer.
Despite having 1GB of ram, increasing the buffer any larger then this caused kernel
instability
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Figure 41: The RPi4’s most significant factor was also A, however when attempting
to use any buffer larger then 256MB caused a kernel panic. It is unclear if the driver
or other part of the software was responsible as no log is generated and the device
becomes completely unresponsive (black screen)
97
4.2.3 Suricata Ratelimit Test
Live signature based detection is another of the fundamental tools in a network
security sensor. While they mostly reactionary and typically wont prevent novel
intrusions, they nonetheless present a hurdle to an attacker. (i.e. Re-using certain
tools or exploits are likely to cause an alert) They are also typically one of the first
stops on a network monitoring pipeline, after raw traffic mirroring [63] [64]. Suricata
is the particular Intrusion Detection System (IDS) of choice for this test, chiefly due
to its inclusion into the Air Force’s Cyberspace Vulnerability Assessment / Hunter
(CVA/H) network monitoring platform but also for its ability to scale across CPU
cores.
4.2.3.1 Selected Factors
As discussed in Section 2.2.2, building a fair benchmark for a IDS can be quite
nebulous. These tools have a large array of tunable controls that requires considera-
tion of hardware available, with the most significant and intractable factor being the
signatures enabled [104]. In Suricata the Detect phase takes up to 80% of the engines
overall CPU processing effort and therefore should be limited to only packets worth
inspecting [1]. The default rule set itself is plagued by poorly written community rules
[105]. Future work is proposed in Chapter V that would address this large variable
but for purposes of this test is outside the scope.
Static Controls
The “default” Emerging Threats ruleset is used in all Suricata tests. This ruleset
contains 25,806 signatures with 20,714 enabled by default [106]. In addition by pre-
processing the benign dataset control file (CIC-Monday-WorkingHours-Fixed.pcap)
in pcap offline mode, 103 noisy rules were manually suppressed which greatly reduces
false positive alerts in later testing. The full exact configuration files used are available
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on the code repository [9]. The particular dataset packet capture replayed for this
test was the CIC-Thursday-WorkingHours-Fixed.pcap as it contained the most alerts
and best blend of attacks (Brute force, cross site scripting, SQL injection, Insider
infiltration, port scanning) [85]










Table 11: CIC 2017 IDS Dataset alert rates before and after suppressing noisy rules
in threshold.config
The default packet ingestion engine is left as AF PACKET. Suricata also supports
other highly specialized methods of ingestion with special hardware like the Endace
DAG network capture card and software like PFRING and Netmap. Typically these
options would be seen in very high throughput environments where the hardware
would otherwise struggle to keep up before ever making it to the application for
decoding. In addition Factors A,B,E (NAPI Budget, Max Kernel Backlog, Backlog
Weight) have been inherited from the previous tests as static inputs to this test.
Variable Controls
The Suricata test has four variable factors which are detailed below.
Factor A: Suricata Runmode
The Suricata engine supports two main multi-threaded operation modes. “Autofp”
(auto flow pinning) mode is the default and is where the engine works in combination
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with the hardware to load balance traffic. “Workers” assume all load balancing is
done in the kernel or driver. The official documentation [1] recommends workers mode
typically performs the best due to cache and thread coherency but other research has
shown this seems to only apply to either specific hardware or precisely tuned setups
[107].
Factor B: Max Pending Packets per Thread
Despite the slightly misleading name the max pending packets tunable actually sets
how many packets can be processed simultaneously. The higher the number the more
busy the system is likely to remain at the cost of more memory. Official documentation
suggests setting it no more then 60,000 as setting too high will result in cache issues
[47]. The default is 1024.
Factor C: Detection Profile
By default, the Suricata engine will group similar rules for decoding based on certain
aspects of the rule. (i.e. UDP vs TCP header based rules). The more groups the
smaller they become and the higher the granularity of their differences, which in turn
positively impacts performance at the cost of more memory. The default is “medium”
or “balanced” [108].
Factor D: RFS Table Size
Once again this factor is a repeat form the interface ratelimit test and packet capture
test. Sort of surprisingly this factor had little to no observable impact in the packet
capture test. It is left in this test to see if it has any influence in the load balancing
done in factor A (runmode).
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(a) Workers Runmode (b) Auto Flow-Pin Runmode
Figure 42: Suricata Runmodes [1]
1 ###FACTOR A###




6 regexp: '^#runmode: '
7 line: "runmode: {{ suricata_runmode }}"
8 when: "'A' in current_factor_list"
9
10 ###FACTOR B###





15 regexp: 'max-pending-packets: 1024'
16 line: "max-pending-packets: {{ suricata_max_pending|int * loop_multiplier|int
}}"↪→
17 when: "'B' in current_factor_list"
18
19 ###FACTOR C###




24 regexp: ' profile: medium'
25 line: " profile: {{ suricata_detect_profile }}"
26 when: "'C' in current_factor_list"
101
4.2.3.2 Test Results
In all test cases each device dropped a substantial amount of traffic but saw sig-
nificant gains applying optimizations. The unoptimized TX1 (Figure 43) dropped
8.4 million out of the 14.1 million packets sent (60%) where after switching to work-
ers mode (A) and increasing Max Pending Packets (B) showed a 47% reduction in
dropped packets to 4 million. Likewise the TX2 (Figure 44) initially dropped 7.3
million packets out of 14.1 (51%) which after optimizations lowered to 3.8 million
(48% reduction). At face value this looks like both devices performed almost identi-
cally however the time scale was not the same for both tests as it was operating at
the device’s interface max PPS limit. For the TX1 this meant it was sent the entire
dataset packet capture in 130 seconds (14.1M / 109k) and the TX2 did the same job
in 93 seconds (14.1M / 151k).
The XAVIER (Figure 45) performed the best of all devices once again but found
its optimal configuration after only one iteration. Initially dropping 4.2 million pack-
ets this lowered to 2 million (53% decrease) after applying factor AB. Interestingly
increasing Max Pending Packets (B) beyond the first iteration yielded worse results
unlike the TX1 and TX2. As hinted in the documentation, this may be a cache con-
tention issue. Since the XAVIER has almost twice as many cores, they likely have
to compete more for the L3 and L2 caches as the number of simultaneous threads
increase. A small diminishing return on B is also visible at the last iteration of the
TX2 test.
The RPi3B+ (Figure 46) was unable to complete the first iteration without sig-
nificant restarts and manual data compilation. The 1GB of RAM on these devices
was not enough to keep the device from going unresponsive during bursts of traffic.
A few iterations of tests did complete and they align with the common theme that
setting the Runmode (A) to workers and increasing Max Pending Packets (B) greatly
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reduced packet loss by 28% from 8.5 million to 6.2 million.
Lastly the RPi4 (Figure 47) greatly improved upon switching to Workers mode
(A), showing a 44% drop (9.2 million to 5.2 million) in lost packets. Further increasing
the Max Pending Packets (B) did not produce any further gains unlike previous results
seen in the NVIDIA boards.
Factors C (Detect Profile) and D (RFS Table Size) appeared to have no strong
independent or combination effect, only appearing on a few initial results due to the
strong outlier pull of factor A.
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Figure 43: The unoptimized TX1 dropped 8.4 million out of the 14.1 million packets
sent (60%) where after switching to workers mode (A) and increasing Max Pending
Packets (B) showed a 47% reduction in dropped packets to 4 million
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Figure 44: The TX2 initially dropped 7.3 million packets out of 14.1 (51%) which
after optimizations similar to the TX1 lowered to 3.8 million (48% reduction)
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Figure 45: The XAVIER performed the best of all devices once again. Initially drop-
ping 4.2 million packets this lowered to 2 million (53% decrease) after applying factor
AB. Interestingly increasing Max Pending Packets (B) beyond the second iteration
yielded worse results unlike the TX1 and TX2. As hinted in the documentation, this
may be a cache contention issue
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Figure 46: The RPi3B+ was unable to complete the first iteration without significant
restarts and manual data compilation. The 1GB of RAM on these devices was not
enough to keep the device from going unresponsive during bursts of traffic. A few
iterations of tests did complete and they align with the common theme that setting
the Runmode (A) to workers and increasing Max Pending Packets (B) greatly reduced
packet loss by 28% from 8.5 million to 6.2 million
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Figure 47: The RPi4 greatly improved upon switching to Workers mode (A), showing
a 44% drop (9.2 million to 5.2 million) in lost packets. Further increasing the Max
Pending Packets (B) did not produce any further gains unlike previous results seen
in the NVIDIA boards
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4.3 Summary
We use the automated test framework described in Section 3.2 to execute three
end-to-end experiments. Each test consisted of a unique network related workload
with a combination of unique and shared input variables across five different devices.
These selected applications not only have shown the validity of the experiment design,
automation, and analysis but also have shown the feasibility of using higher end edge
devices like the XAVIER, TX2 and RPi4 as a edge network sensors. The next chapter
provides some conclusions with respect to the overall effort and presents multiple




The objective of this research was to develop a macro level methodology to opti-
mize and benchmark specific workloads on emerging edge devices. Since these devices
come in a wide range of capability and the potential workloads to evaluate on them
are numerous, the developed process needed to be easy to use, modify and scale as
needed. Likewise the workloads needed to be properly tuned for their specific device
due to tighter performance envelopes.
The main deliverable was the implementation of an automated workflow using
Ansible, an open-source automation, configuration, and application deployment tool
[8]. By not requiring any dedicated agent or other prerequisite, deploying a test to
a new device is trivial and the human readable task playbooks made it easy to swap
workloads and associated variables. As sub-components of the workflow, a multi
stage optimization process and robust analysis process ensures the test workload is
maximizing the use of available resources.
Optimization is met through a multiple iteration 2k Full Factorial experiment.
This allows the operator to select up to five potential optimization factors and ensures
any positive or negative interactions between any factor are appropriately captured.
By attempting these factors multiple times at varying levels the “ideal” level for all
chosen factors emerges (e.g. sizing a buffer in memory without under or oversizing
it). The analysis process utilizes a standard Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) test
to provide rigor to the results of the optimization. In cases where ANOVA fails and
normality is violated, a simpler heuristic analysis examines the averages of the results.
In order to fully exercise and validate the developed process, a family of network
security monitoring applications were run in an end to end scenario. Utilizing edge
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devices to fill in network monitoring gaps was a key initial motivator of this research
as it is a task that has been traditionally done in only large centralized deployments.
The analysis of the results show the developed process met it’s original design goals
and intentions, with the added fact that edge devices like the XAVIER, TX2 and
RPi4 can easily perform as a edge network sensor.
5.2 Future Work
Overall progress on the benchmark is complete, and can be immediately imple-
mented using new workloads. There is still some room to polish and grow as detailed
next and is suggested next. More network monitoring related tests and integration’s
are also proposed in Section 5.2.2 and Appendix B (Employment)
5.2.1 Benchmark Use & Expansion
5.2.1.1 ANOVA Randomness
The randomness over the overall testing is not ideal. When testing a particular
factor combination, they are done sequentially (i.e. A-A-A-A-A, AB-AB-AB-AB-
AB). This was done to save initial development and testing time. A simple Python
script that generates an array of random factor combos could be added before the
middle loops begin. This would allow for true replicate testing (i.e. A,ABC,E,B,A...)
at the expense of time. Each new factor letter combo would reset the machines and
reload that particular configuration.
5.2.1.2 Error Handling
The ANOVA Python script is also very sensitive to errors in the output csv.(see
example in Figure 48 If for whatever reason a particular run did not finish it will
break the calculations of the contrasts, which causes the entire process to stop till
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fixed. Manually entering the missing number to the csv, and then resuming with
--skip-tags initial will resume the outer loop at the point it stopped.
Figure 48: Example of Runtime Error (Missing Data)
5.2.1.3 Other Applications
While all the results discussed in Chapter IV are related to network applications,
the metric gathering subprocess laid out in Section 3.2.3.5 supports 22 possible Re-
sponse Variable (RV). More can be added to the bash script, or the current ones could
be used in future workloads under research. A full example of some of the output
data is proved in Appendix C.
(a) Example CPU Utilization Variable (b) Example CPU Temperature Variable




Both the analysis Python and metric gathering scripts are simply called by the
Ansible workflow. This means with little effort they can be either modified or swapped
for other scripts without impacting the core of the automation.
Figure 50: Block diagram showing the sub-components that can be modified or
swapped without affecting the automation
5.2.2 Network Monitoring Expansion
5.2.2.1 Other Sensor Roles
The roles tested in Chapter IV were only a small slice of the possible network sen-
sor roles. Selecting a new application to test (like netflow monitoring with Zeek/Bro)
should be trivial to implement. More advanced future work, like how an edge sensor
could tie into an Elastic database for visualization, or how it may be the solution to
other long looming problems like monitoring encrypted traffic and detecting credential
abuse are all discussed Appendix B.
5.2.2.2 Suricata Rules Evaluation
Perhaps the most significant performance variable for a signature based Intrusion
Detection System (IDS) like Suricata are the signatures enabled [104]. In Suricata
the Detect phase takes up to 80% of the engines overall CPU processing effort and
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therefore should be limited to only packets worth inspecting [1]. Unfortunately, de-
fault rule sets are at best, good at catching low hanging very unsophisticated attacks.
Thanks to their open nature it is trivial for an attacker to download the rules, inspect
how they are detecting a certain payload or characteristic and modify theirs to evade
it. These default rules also also plagued with poorly optimized rules which makes
using them in a performance benchmark a tough decision. [105]
As an example, it is quite easy to write poor rules like:
alert tcp any any -> any any (pcre: "the_payload")
Where every single Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) packet seen by the en-
gine will be deeply inspected using a pearl regular expression. Too many of these
kind of inspections can cripple the performance of the system [109] [105]. By prop-
erly scoping the rule down to a particular destination (like a web server) the engine
will move on much earlier in it’s decode phase which only carries about 10-20% of
the overall workload. This rule can be further enhanced by taking advantage of fast-
pattern matching which furthers this filtering effort only looking at small byte chunks
instead of the entire rule first [75].
It should be possible to use our benchmark to implement the methodology of
[104] to test how the amount of rules and their composition affects the edge device’s
performance. Using this test a ”max rule count” count be established for a given
device.
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Appendix A. Annotated Example Results Figure
Figure 51 below also provides a breakdown of how to interpret the main results
figures seen in Sections 4.2.1.2, 4.2.2.2, and 4.2.3.2.
Figure 51: Highlighted example of a results figure. The explanation of each number
is listed above
1. Significant results from the first test are extracted from the whole result (Ex-
ample in Appendix C)
2. The unoptimized baseline average is established, and is updated based on best
average of the previous loop
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3. The significant factor levels are increased and are compared against the new
baseline, determining if additional testing is required
4. The actual variable levels set are displayed for each “loop” column
5. The results of the first analysis test
6. The results of subsequent analysis tests
7. After the last loop shows no improvement, final score is displayed
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Appendix B. Employment Analysis
Contributing to Indexing & Aggregation
One last capstone test was designed to observe how well the single board com-
puters would play together when sending their alerts back to a central Elasticsearch
aggregator. For this standalone test, the 3 NVIDIA boards and the RPi4 were fed
the Thursday-WorkingHours-Fixed.pcap file at their appropriate ”Suricata Packets
Per Second (PPS) Limit.” An ARM compatible filebeat agent (log shipper) was built
for each device and deployed to ingest the logs that Suricata was generating. At this
small level of traffic the filebeats would just report directly back to the Elasticsearch
database, instead of typical large scale deployments which go through another ag-
gregator like Logstash or Kafka. Using the results from pretesting in Table 11 we
would expect to see around 2,472 alerts on each device (logged locally) and the same
amount on the aggregated back end. Table 12 below summarizes the result of this
capstone test.
Alerts Run 1 Alerts Run 2 Alerts Run 3
Local Indexed % Local Indexed % Local Indexed %
TX1 2457 2448 99.6 2445 2437 99.7 1727 1417 82.0
TX2 2518 2512 99.8 2515 2433 96.7 2489 2463 98.9
XAVIER 2541 2446 96.2 2547 2386 93.7 2542 2510 98.7
RPi4 1736 1717 98.9 1697 1697 100 1868 1868 100
Table 12: Local Logged Alerts Vs. Elastic Indexed Alerts shows only a slight disparity
in a few cases
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Figure 52: Kibana Dashboard with all alerts reporting. The timestamps are different
due to slight wall clock drift between devices
This test verified the Elastic “beat” agent is built to ensure a “at-least-once”
delivery of all events it sees. This is accomplished via a registry that tracks the
state of each line in each log it is tracking [110]. By essentially acknowledging each
individual event it both makes sure it is not reported multiple times but also makes
sure every event is processed. Due to this, despite the four devices competing for the
802.11 ad-hoc link all the events do indeed eventually make it to the index. The only
exception would be if log rotation were enabled and the file was deleted before it was
fully processed. This bodes well for future integration with greater platforms like the
Air Force’s Cyberspace Vulnerability Assessment / Hunter (CVA/H).
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Figure 53: Integration with existing Air Force dashboards should be feasible
Encrypted Traffic Enterprises
While much of the early successes of hunt teams likely came from unencrypted
network traffic based investigations (based on the tooling available at the time) the
proliferation of encryption across web and domain traffic renders most traditional
tools like Intrusion Detection System (IDS) ineffective [111]. At this point the only
reasonable way to do threat hunting will be with very strict log and netflow coverage
to observe anomalies. This means having a proper data pipeline with all gaps covered,
perhaps with edge sensors on the ”last mile” of the enterprise.
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Figure 54: Rapid Increase of Encrypted Web [2]
Forged Kerberos Detection
One of the key strengths of a kerberos based authentication scheme is compart-
mentalizing authentication to a trusted third party. In the case of Windows Active
Directory the Domain Controller (DC) acts as the master or Key Distribution Cen-
ter (KDC). This protects credentials from being fully exposed should a part of the
domain become compromised. It does however create a potential single point of fail-
ure should the KDC ever become compromised. Figure 55 below shows a high level
overview of a client (grey) requesting a service from the server (black). The Ticket
to Grant Tickets (TGT) is the client’s initial authentication into the domain, from
which they can request further access to other resources like a file share or remote
terminal from the Ticket Granting Service (TGS). These tickets are meant to be time
limited and point to point constrained tokens that protect against credential theft
and Main-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks [3] [112]. A few design choices (stateless
tickets and omitting the last ”trust but verify” handshake) in the Windows Active
Directory implementation of the protocol however enables three attacks that can be
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devastating for an entire enterprise.
Figure 55: Kerberos Authentication in a Windows Domain[3]
Golden Ticket Attack
The TGT is encrypted by the password hash of a service account called krbtgt on the
KDC. Should this password hash be exposed an attacker could forge TGTs as any
user in any group on the domain, as the KDC uses the krbtgt hash as a litmus test
of is this request legitimate. Since the KDC does not track states it does not mind
that steps 1 and 2 above were skipped, and will give the attacker the service ticket
they desire. This attack would be evident by looking for the absence of the first two
steps in logs or traffic going to the DC. [3] [113] [114]
121
Figure 56: Golden Ticket Attack
Silver Ticket Attack
Individual services are protected by their own service account hash which is used in
the generation of the TGS. Should this particular hash be exposed (which can be
assumed likely if the main krbtgt hashes were as well), an attacker could forge service
tickets as any user in any group on the domain. The service uses its own hash as a
litmus test of is this request legitimate and since the service is not aware of any state
on the DC it has no idea that steps 1-4 were skipped and assumes the request is okay.
This attack while more limited compared to the golden ticket attack is considerably
more difficult to detect as no logs appear on the DC. It would only be evident by
looking for the absence of steps 3 and 4 in logs or traffic going to the DC compared
to what was observed in logs and traffic going to the service in steps 5 and 6. [114]
[113]
122
Figure 57: Silver Ticket Attack
Pass-The-Ticket Attack
Pass the ticket is similar to the Golden and Silver attack minus the forging step.
Instead, the adversary just steals a valid ticket out of memory and re-uses it. These
tickets have a limited lifetime but depending who they stole it from may allow them
to elevate even further. The attack signatures will be very similar to the other two
attacks as well. [114] [115]
Getting access to the critical logs in a hunt scenario can be administratively chal-
lenging and may even tip off the presence of a hunt team to a cautious adversary.
The logs themselves may even be manipulated by a deeply persistent threat, as has
been demonstrated by multiple Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) [53] [116] [117].
The only remaining method to detect this attack would then require monitoring the
network traffic between every host, something large centralized boundary sensors are
123
likely not doing. By employing a network of edge sensors at these lower levels, these
lateral movement anomalies may finally become visible in the network traffic alone.
124
Appendix C. Raw Data Examples
Full data is available under the “Results” folder on the GitHub Repository [9].
Figure 58 below shows a full box plot example from the interface rate test. Table
13 afterwards is an example of the full data available from the metric gathering
subprocess. Some columns were removed to make it fit on a page.
125

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix D. Source Code
Setup and Usage
Full code, and latest user guide is on the GitHub repository [9].
1. Install Ansible package on control workstation (i.e.)
apt install ansible
2. Install OS and desired network configuration for systems under test
3. If environment has no DNS, add IP addresses to the hosts file of the Ansible
































5. Build vars.yml, static-controls.yml, and variable-controls.yml playbooks with
desired experiment variables. See fully implemented tests (interface, pcap, suricata)
for examples
134
6. Fill playbook benchmark-innerloop.yml with the workload to test and fill in
placeholders.
#This playbook is the "inner" loop
- name: Launch Performance Monitor (Factors {{ current_factor_list }})
shell: "./gather_stats.bash <<**PID**>> <<**SAMPLE RATE**>> {{
current_factor_list }}"↪→
args:






# <<**YOUR WORKLOAD TASK(S) GOES HERE.....**>>
# SEE RATELIMIT TEST FOR EXAMPLE
7. Replace placeholders (shown as %%%%) in benchmark-middleloop.yml, benchmark-
outerloop.yml and benchmark-main.yml with appropriate variable names.
- name: Record Initial Variable Levels
set_fact:
A_levels: "{{A_levels}} + [ '%%%%%' ]"
B_levels: "{{B_levels}} + [ '%%%%%' ]"
C_levels: "{{C_levels}} + [ '%%%%%' ]"
D_levels: "{{D_levels}} + [ '%%%%%' ]"
E_levels: "{{E_levels}} + [ '%%%%%' ]"
8. Generate some SSH keys if you don’t have them already
ssh-keygen
9. If first time, run prep-playbook.yml to setup SSH keys and dependencies
ansible-playbook -i inventory.yml --ask-pass --ask-become-pass prep-playbook.yml
10. Run the main playbook once all placeholders have been filled and set:
ansible-playbook -i inventory.yml suricata-bench-playbook.yml
11. Intermediate and raw .csv results will be generated on each device and copied
back to the current working directory
12. At the end of all testing, a final log will be generated that details the best
level of each factor and a final performance score.
135
Tips and Tricks
Overriding variables from command line is done with -e:
ansible-playbook -i inventory.yml -e "pps_limit=104000" suricata-benchmark-main.yml
Limiting to only certain hosts from inventory is done with -l:
ansible-playbook -i inventory.yml -l nvidia,rpi4 pcap-bench-playbook.yml
Play only certain factors on certain devices:
ansible-playbook -i inventory.yml -l rpi4 -e '{"factor_combos": [E,AE,BE,ABE,CE,ACE,BCE,ABCE,
DE,ADE,BDE,ABDE,CDE,ACDE,BCDE,ABCDE]}' suricata-benchmark-main.yml
Jump directly into the third iteration of a optimization loop
ansible-playbook -i inventory.yml -l rpi4 -e "test_counter=3" -e '{"significant_factors_array":
[ABCE]}' -e "last_loop_best=3940539" -e "target_to_beat=5084844" suricata-benchmark-main.yml
Debug ”play” is very useful and can grab stdout from each device:
- name: Send Traffic via tcpreplay.
local_action:
module: shell























12 #TOTAL_RUNTIME=£(( £PACKETS_EXPECTED / £PPS + 5 )) #plus for cooldown buffer
13 #TOTAL_RUNTIME=60
14
15 if [ -z "$4" ]; then
16 echo "Usage: bash $0 <test pps rate> <monitor pid> <capture interface> <sample
rate in sec> optional: <packets expected> <tuning_factors>"↪→
17 echo "ex: bash $0 100000 8912 eth0 0.5 2000000 ABCD"
18 echo "a negative pid will watch only the interface / softirq handler"
19 echo "**sudo access required**"
20 exit 1
21 elif [ -z "$5" ]; then
22 TOTAL_RUNTIME=60
23 TUNING_FACTORS=N
24 elif [ -z "$6" ]; then
25 TOTAL_RUNTIME=$(( $PACKETS_EXPECTED / $PPS + 5 )) #plus for cooldown buffer
26 TUNING_FACTORS=N
27 elif [ -z "$7" ]; then




32 cd "$(dirname "$0")"
33 if [ -f gather.pid ]; then
34 echo "Unclean shutdown of previous run. Ending it now.."
35 sudo kill $(cat gather.pid)
36 sleep 2
37 fi




42 if [ $PID -lt '0' ]; then
43 echo "Using interface rate mode only";
44 #Watching softirq daemon, that handles the last half of the interrupt from the
NIC↪→
45 #Thread 0 is most likely on the ARM based boards (first thread)
46 #kernel threads like this wont show memory stats
47 PID=$(top -b -n1 | grep ksoftirq | head -1 | awk '{ print $1 }');
48 PROCESS_NAME=ksoftirqd0;
49 elif [ ! -d /proc/$PID ]; then
50 echo "supplied PID $PID isn't running, exiting";
51 exit 1;
52 else PROCESS_NAME=$(ps -p $PID -o comm=); fi
53
54 #Might be a better way to fingerprint the machine
55 if [ $(sudo lshw -short -c system | awk 'FNR == 3 {print $2}') == 'Raspberry' ];
then DEVICE_FAM=pi;↪→
56 elif [ $(sudo lshw -short -c system | awk 'FNR == 3 {print $2}') == 'Jetson-TX1'
]; then DEVICE_FAM=nvidia-tx1;↪→
57 elif [ $(sudo lshw -short -c system | awk 'FNR == 3 {print $2}') == 'quill' ];
then DEVICE_FAM=nvidia-tx2;↪→
58 elif [ $(sudo lshw -short -c system | awk 'FNR == 3 {print $2}') == 'Jetson-AGX'
]; then DEVICE_FAM=nvidia-xavier;↪→
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59 else DEVICE_FAM=unknown; fi
60
61 #top has to be kept running to gather accurate CPU stats over time.
62 #See man page for how it calcs this. ps doesn't provide useful data, see man page
as well↪→
63 #debian buster has newer version of top that defaults to MB, we want KB
64 if [ $(lsb_release -c -s) == 'buster' ]; then
65 top -p $PID -b -d 1 -E k > $tmp/toptmp &
66 sleep 2
67 else




72 #let top warmup..very important. rip my 3 hours troubleshooting this regression
73 sleep 3
74
75 sudo renice -n -15 $(pidof top) &> /dev/null #bump my top process priority
76 sudo renice -n -20 $$ &> /dev/null #bump my priority to max
77
78 #Initialize vars
79 declare -a PID_CPU_PERCENT
80 declare -a PID_MEM_PERCENT
81 declare -a PID_MEM_MB
82 declare -a UTILIZATION_CPU
83 declare -a TEMPERATURE_CPU
84 declare -a POWER_CPU
85 declare -a MEM_AVAIL_PERCENT
86 declare -a MEM_AVAIL_MB
87 declare -a RXPPS
88 declare -a RXBPS
89 declare -a IFACE_DROPS
90 declare -a KERN_DROPS
91
92 NIC_DRIVER=$(ethtool -i $IFACE | head -1 | awk '{ print $2 }')
93 TOTAL_MEM_MB=$(bc <<< 'scale=2; '$(tail -5 $tmp/toptmp | head -n 1 | awk '{ print












105 if [ "$NIC_DRIVER" == 'e1000e' ] || [ "$NIC_DRIVER" == 'igb' ] || [ "$NIC_DRIVER"
== 'tg3' ] || [ "$NIC_DRIVER" == 'bcmgenet' ] ; then↪→
106 IFACE_DROP_LAST=$(cat /sys/class/net/$IFACE/statistics/rx_missed_errors);
107 elif [ "$NIC_DRIVER" == 'lan78xx' ]; then
108 IFACE_DROP_LAST=$(ethtool -S $IFACE | grep "RX Dropped Frames:" | awk '{ print $4
}');↪→
109 elif [ "$NIC_DRIVER" == 'eqos' ]; then




113 function captureLap {
114 #Time dependant ("per second") samples below.
115 RX_PKTS_NOW=$(cat /sys/class/net/$IFACE/statistics/rx_packets)









122 #Handle bizzare rare case where a negative number gets calculated on super
heavily loaded machine↪→
123 #Happens on Pi based boards, the interface seems to temporarily "reset" its stats
counters?↪→
124 if [ ${RXBPS[$LOOP_COUNT]} -lt "0" ]; then RXBPS[$LOOP_COUNT]=0; fi
125 if [ ${RXPPS[$LOOP_COUNT]} -lt "0" ]; then RXPPS[$LOOP_COUNT]=0; fi
126
127 #Specific to suricata...
128 #TX1 and rpi3 version of suricatasc have this in a different spot..
129 if [ "$PROCESS_NAME" == "Suricata-Main" ]; then
130 if [ "$DEVICE_FAM" == 'nvidia-tx1' ]; then
131 KERN_DROP_NOW=$(suricatasc /var/run/suricata-command.socket -c "iface-stat
$IFACE" | awk '{ print $5 }'| egrep -o [0-9]+)↪→
132 #elif [ "£NIC_DRIVER" == 'lan78xx' ]; then
133 # KERN_DROP_NOW=£(suricatasc /var/run/suricata-command.socket -c "iface-stat
£IFACE" | awk '{ print £11 }'| egrep -o [0-9]+)↪→
134 else
135 KERN_DROP_NOW=$(suricatasc /var/run/suricata-command.socket -c "iface-stat
$IFACE" | awk '{ print $7 }'| egrep -o [0-9]+)↪→
136 fi







143 #Driver specific stat locations
144 if [ "$NIC_DRIVER" == 'lan78xx' ]; then
145 IFACE_DROP_NOW=$(ethtool -S $IFACE | grep "RX Dropped Frames:" | awk '{print
$4}')↪→
146 IFACE_DROPS[$LOOP_COUNT]=$(bc <<< "scale=0; ($IFACE_DROP_NOW-$IFACE_DROP_LAST) /
$LOOP_TIME_REAL ")↪→
147 IFACE_DROP_LAST=$IFACE_DROP_NOW
148 elif [ "$NIC_DRIVER" == 'e1000e' ] || [ "$NIC_DRIVER" == 'igb' ] || [
"$NIC_DRIVER" == 'tg3' ] || [ "$NIC_DRIVER" == 'bcmgenet' ]; then↪→
149 IFACE_DROP_NOW=$(cat /sys/class/net/$IFACE/statistics/rx_missed_errors)
150 IFACE_DROPS[$LOOP_COUNT]=$(bc <<< "scale=0; ($IFACE_DROP_NOW-$IFACE_DROP_LAST) /
$LOOP_TIME_REAL ")↪→
151 IFACE_DROP_LAST=$IFACE_DROP_NOW
152 elif [ "$NIC_DRIVER" == 'eqos' ]; then
153 IFACE_DROP_NOW=$(ethtool -S $IFACE | grep rx_fifo_overflow | awk '{ print $2
}');↪→





158 #Device specific sensors, not super efficient
159 if [ "$DEVICE_FAM" == 'pi' ]; then
160 TEMPERATURE_CPU[$LOOP_COUNT]=$(vcgencmd measure_temp | grep -ow
"[0-9][0-9].[0-9]")↪→
161 POWER_CPU[$LOOP_COUNT]=$(expr $(vcgencmd measure_clock arm | grep -oP "([0-9]+)"
| tail -1) / 1000000)↪→
162 elif [ "$DEVICE_FAM" == 'nvidia-tx1' ]; then
163 TEMPERATURE_CPU[$LOOP_COUNT]=$(bc <<< 'scale=1; '$(cat
/sys/devices/virtual/thermal/thermal_zone1/temp)' / 1000')↪→





165 elif [ "$DEVICE_FAM" == 'nvidia-tx2' ]; then
166 TEMPERATURE_CPU[$LOOP_COUNT]=$(bc <<< 'scale=1; '$(cat
/sys/devices/virtual/thermal/thermal_zone1/temp)' / 1000')↪→
167 POWER_CPU[$LOOP_COUNT]=$(bc <<< 'scale=3; '$(cat
/sys/bus/i2c/drivers/ina3221x/0-0041/iio_device/in_power0_input)' / 1000')↪→
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168 elif [ "$DEVICE_FAM" == 'nvidia-xavier' ]; then
169 TEMPERATURE_CPU[$LOOP_COUNT]=$(bc <<< 'scale=1; '$(cat
/sys/devices/virtual/thermal/thermal_zone0/temp)' / 1000')↪→







176 #Regular sensors / reports
177 PID_MEM_PERCENT[$LOOP_COUNT]=$(ps -p $PID -o pmem --no-headers)
178 PID_MEM_MB[$LOOP_COUNT]=$(bc <<< 'scale=0; '$(ps -p $PID -o rss --no-headers)' /
976.562' )↪→
179 PID_CPU_PERCENT[$LOOP_COUNT]=$(tail -1 $tmp/toptmp | awk '{ print $9 }')
180 MEM_AVAIL_MB[$LOOP_COUNT]=$(bc <<< 'scale=0; '$(tail -5 $tmp/toptmp | head -n 1 |
awk '{ print $6 + $10 }')' / 976.562' )↪→
181 MEM_AVAIL_PERCENT[$LOOP_COUNT]=$(bc <<< "scale=1; ${MEM_AVAIL_MB[$LOOP_COUNT]} /
$TOTAL_MEM_MB * 100" )↪→
182 UTILIZATION_CPU[$LOOP_COUNT]=$(tail -6 $tmp/toptmp | head -n 1 | awk '{ print $2
+ $4 + $6 + $10 + $12 + $14 }')↪→
183
184
185 # uncomment for live debugging
186 # echo txPPS\: £PPS - \%CPU\: £{PID_CPU_PERCENT[£LOOP_COUNT]} - TOTAL CPU\:
£{UTILIZATION_CPU[£LOOP_COUNT]} - \%MEM\: £{PID_MEM_PERCENT[£LOOP_COUNT]} -
MEM MB\: £{PID_MEM_MB[£LOOP_COUNT]} - \
↪→
↪→
187 # MB FREE\: £{MEM_AVAIL_MB[£LOOP_COUNT]} - TEMPERATURE_CPU\(C\)\:
£{TEMPERATURE_CPU[£LOOP_COUNT]} - CPU POWER\: £{POWER_CPU[£LOOP_COUNT]} -
rxPPS\: £{RXPPS[£LOOP_COUNT]} - \
↪→
↪→
188 #rxmbps\: £{RXBPS[£LOOP_COUNT]} - iface drps\: £{IFACE_DROPS[£LOOP_COUNT]}, krn
drps\: £{KERN_DROPS[£LOOP_COUNT]}, loop\: £LOOP_TIME_REAL↪→
189
190 (( LOOP_COUNT=LOOP_COUNT+1 ))
191 }
192
193 function buildFinalStats {
194
195 #Moved out of critial loop region
196 IFS=$'\n'
197 MAX_PID_CPU_PERCENT=$(echo "${PID_CPU_PERCENT[*]}" | sort -nr | head -n1)
198 MAX_PID_MEM_PERCENT=$(echo "${PID_MEM_PERCENT[*]}" | sort -nr | head -1)
199 MAX_PID_MEM_MB=$(echo "${PID_MEM_MB[*]}" | sort -nr | head -1)
200 MAX_UTILIZATION_CPU=$(echo "${UTILIZATION_CPU[*]}" | sort -nr | head -1)
201 MIN_MEM_AVAIL_PERCENT=$(echo "${MEM_AVAIL_PERCENT[*]}" | sort -nr | tail -1)
202 MIN_MEM_AVAIL_MB=$(echo "${MEM_AVAIL_MB[*]}" | sort -nr | tail -1)
203 MAX_TEMPERATURE_CPU=$(echo "${TEMPERATURE_CPU[*]}" | sort -nr | head -1)
204 MAX_POWER_CPU=$(echo "${POWER_CPU[*]}" | sort -nr | head -1)
205 MAX_RXBPS=$(echo "${RXBPS[*]}" | sort -nr | head -1)
206 MAX_RXPPS=$(echo "${RXPPS[*]}" | sort -nr | head -1)
207
208 #Averages.
209 #Zeros may throw off averages if they're not likely (fully overloaded,etc)
210 #Can count the number of zeros in the array so they dont throw off averages
211 #( All items in array / (Array size - zero count) )
212 IFS='+'
213 (( RX_PKTS_TOTAL=RX_PKTS_LAST-RX_PKTS_FIRST ))
214
215 #currently only suricata gives access to real time kernel drops. dont remove
zeros↪→
216 if [ "$PROCESS_NAME" == "Suricata-Main" ]; then
217 SUM_KERN_DROPS=$(echo "${KERN_DROPS[*]}"|bc)
218 echo "kern drop number: ${#KERN_DROPS[@]}"
219 AVG_KERN_DROPS=$(echo "(${KERN_DROPS[*]}) / ${#KERN_DROPS[@]}" | bc 2>
/dev/null)↪→
220 KERN_DROPS_PERCENT=$(bc <<< "scale=2; $SUM_KERN_DROPS / $RX_PKTS_TOTAL * 100")
221 elif [ "$PROCESS_NAME" == "tcpdump" ]; then
140
222 AVG_KERN_DROPS=NA
223 SUM_KERN_DROPS=$(cat counters | awk ' FNR == 4 {print $1}')
224 KERN_DROPS_PERCENT=$(bc <<< "scale=3; $SUM_KERN_DROPS / $RX_PKTS_TOTAL")
#Percent dropped after making it past the first round...↪→
225 rm -rf counters








234 AVG_IFACE_DROPS=$(echo "(${IFACE_DROPS[*]}) / (${#IFACE_DROPS[*]} - $(echo
${IFACE_DROPS[*]} | grep -ow '0' | wc -l))"|bc 2> /dev/null)↪→
235 IFACE_DROPS_PERCENT=$(bc <<< "scale=2; $SUM_IFACE_DROPS / $PACKETS_EXPECTED *
100")↪→
236 AVG_RXPPS=$(echo "(${RXPPS[*]}) / (${#RXPPS[*]} - $(echo ${RXPPS[*]} | grep -ow
'0' | wc -l))"|bc 2> /dev/null)↪→
237 AVG_RXBPS=$(echo "(${RXBPS[*]}) / (${#RXBPS[*]} - $(echo ${RXBPS[*]} | grep -ow
'0' | wc -l))"|bc 2> /dev/null)↪→
238 AVG_PID_MEM_PERCENT=$(echo "scale=1; (${PID_MEM_PERCENT[*]}) /




239 AVG_PID_CPU_PERCENT=$(echo "scale=1; (${PID_CPU_PERCENT[*]}) /




240 AVG_POWER_CPU=$(echo "scale=3; (${POWER_CPU[*]}) / (${#POWER_CPU[*]} - $(echo
${POWER_CPU[*]} | grep -ow '0' | wc -l))"|bc 2> /dev/null)↪→
241 AVG_TEMPERATURE_CPU=$(echo "scale=1; (${TEMPERATURE_CPU[*]}) /




242 AVG_UTILIZATION_CPU=$(echo "scale=1; (${UTILIZATION_CPU[*]}) /








247 function printVerboseStats {
248



















258 function finish {
259 rm -rf "$tmp"
260 rm -rf gather.pid
261


















271 #handle some empty cases before writing to file
272 if [ -z "$AVG_IFACE_DROPS" ]; then AVG_IFACE_DROPS=0; fi
273 if [ -z "$AVG_KERN_DROPS" ]; then AVG_KERN_DROPS=0; fi
274 if [ -z "$AVG_RXBPS" ]; then AVG_RXBPS=0; fi
275 if [ -z "$AVG_RXPPS" ]; then AVG_RXPPS=0; fi
276 if [ -z "$AVG_PID_CPU_PERCENT" ]; then AVG_PID_CPU_PERCENT=0.0; fi
277 if [ -z "$AVG_PID_MEM_PERCENT" ]; then AVG_PID_MEM_PERCENT=0.0; fi
278 if [ -z "$AVG_UTILIZATION_CPU" ]; then AVG_UTILIZATION_CPU=0.0; fi
279 if [ ${TEMPERATURE_CPU[0]} == 'NA' ]; then AVG_TEMPERATURE_CPU=NA;
MAX_TEMPERATURE_CPU=NA; fi↪→









287 echo "Total packets past kernel phase: $RX_PKTS_TOTAL"
288 #echo "Iface Drops: £SUM_IFACE_DROPS £IFACE_DROPS_PERCENT%"
289 #echo "kern drops: £SUM_KERN_DROPS £KERN_DROPS_PERCENT%"
290
291 (head -n2 && tail -n1) < $HOSTNAME-$NIC_DRIVER-$PROCESS_NAME-results.csv | column
-t -s ,↪→
292 #column -t -s , £HOSTNAME-£NIC_DRIVER-£PROCESS_NAME-results.csv




297 ##"main" function below
298 #sleep 2 #brief warmup
299 trap finish EXIT #Capture ctrl-c or kill signals so I can cleanup
300
301 echo "Watching process: $PROCESS_NAME ($PID)"
302 echo "I'm running on a: $DEVICE_FAM board with a $NIC_DRIVER interface "
303 echo "runtime will be $TOTAL_RUNTIME with factors $TUNING_FACTORS"
304 SECONDS=0
305 exec 3>&1 4>&2 #bash magic to get the output of the time command and save the
functions stdout/stderr↪→
306 while [[ -d /proc/$PID && $SECONDS -lt $TOTAL_RUNTIME ]]
307 do
308 #This needs to be as close as possible to SAMPLE_RATE sec for "per second"
calculations to be accurate↪→
309 #As system load nears 100% the loop will likely drift, so try to account for it.
310 #Still not perfect, but close enough for now.
311 { time {
312 sleep $SAMPLE_RATE & captureLap 1>&3 2>&4;
313 if [ ${RXPPS[$LOOP_COUNT-1]} -lt '10' ]; then SECONDS=0; fi #Dont start the
countdown till packets start arriving. 10 accounts for random broadcasts↪→





1 #The pandas .convert_objects() function is deprecated




5 import matplotlib.pyplot as plt
6 import pandas as pd
7 from scipy import stats
8 from scipy.stats import norm
9 import numpy as np
10 import seaborn as sns
11 import statsmodels.api as sm






18 #Thanks to Marvin for Python help
19
20 if len(sys.argv) <= 5:
21 print("Not enough args usage: anova.py <*.csv> <rv1,rv2> <factors> <replicates>
<alpha> optional: device")↪→
22 print("ex: anova.py testdata.csv nicdrop,avg 5 10 .05 TX1")
23 print("<rv> is response variable, note comma in example")
24 print("\"Device\" is used in normplot of effects, omit to skip graph")
25 exit()
26
27 n = int(sys.argv[4]) #replicates
28 k = int(sys.argv[3]) #factors
29 alpha = float(sys.argv[5])
30 rv = sys.argv[2].split(',')
31 input_csv_parse = sys.argv[1].split('-')
32
33
34 if k > 5 or k < 1:




39 data2 = pd.read_csv(sys.argv[1], header=[0,1])
40 response_var = data2[[rv[0],'factors']]
41 response_var.columns = response_var.columns.get_level_values(1)
42 #print(response_var.groupby('code').mean().sort_values(by=[rv[1]]).round(0))
43
44 if(k >= 1):
45 df_index=['A', 'Error', 'Total']
46 one = response_var[response_var['code'] == 'N'].loc[:,rv[1]].to_numpy()
47 a = response_var[response_var['code'] == 'A'].loc[:,rv[1]].to_numpy()
48 means_all = np.array([np.mean(a)])
49 total = np.array([one, a])
50 contrast_A = np.sum(-one + a)
51 contrasts_all = np.array([contrast_A])
52 if(k >= 2):
53 df_index=['A', 'B', 'AB', 'Error', 'Total']
54 one = response_var[response_var['code'] == 'N'].loc[:,rv[1]].to_numpy()
55 a = response_var[response_var['code'] == 'A'].loc[:,rv[1]].to_numpy()
56 b = response_var[response_var['code'] == 'B'].loc[:,rv[1]].to_numpy()
57 ab = response_var[response_var['code'] == 'AB'].loc[:,rv[1]].to_numpy()
58 means_all = np.array([np.mean(a), np.mean(b), np.mean(ab)])
59 total = np.array([one, a, b, ab])
60 contrast_A = np.sum(-one + a - b + ab)
61 contrast_B = np.sum(-one - a + b + ab)
62 contrast_AB = np.sum(one - a - b + ab)
63 contrasts_all = np.array([contrast_A, contrast_B, contrast_AB])
64 if(k >= 3):
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65 df_index=['A', 'B', 'AB', 'C', 'AC', 'BC', 'ABC', 'Error', 'Total']
66 c = response_var[response_var['code'] == 'C'].loc[:,rv[1]].to_numpy()
67 ac = response_var[response_var['code'] == 'AC'].loc[:,rv[1]].to_numpy()
68 bc = response_var[response_var['code'] == 'BC'].loc[:,rv[1]].to_numpy()
69 abc = response_var[response_var['code'] == 'ABC'].loc[:,rv[1]].to_numpy()
70 means_all = np.array([np.mean(a), np.mean(b), np.mean(ab), np.mean(c),
np.mean(ac), np.mean(bc), np.mean(abc)])↪→
71 total = np.array([one, a, b, ab, c, ac, bc, abc])
72 contrast_A = np.sum(-one + a - b + ab - c + ac - bc + abc)
73 contrast_B = np.sum(-one - a + b + ab - c - ac + bc + abc)
74 contrast_AB = np.sum(one - a - b + ab + c - ac - bc + abc)
75 contrast_C = np.sum(-one - a - b - ab + c + ac + bc + abc)
76 contrast_AC = np.sum(one - a + b - ab - c + ac - bc + abc)
77 contrast_BC = np.sum(one + a - b - ab - c - ac + bc + abc)
78 contrast_ABC= np.sum(-one+ a + b - ab + c - ac - bc + abc)
79 contrasts_all = np.array([contrast_A, contrast_B, contrast_AB, contrast_C,
contrast_AC, contrast_BC, contrast_ABC])↪→
80 if(k >= 4):
81 df_index=['A', 'B', 'AB', 'C', 'AC', 'BC', 'ABC', 'D', 'AD', 'BD', 'ABD', 'CD',
'ACD', 'BCD', 'ABCD', 'Error', 'Total']↪→
82 d = response_var[response_var['code'] == 'D'].loc[:,rv[1]].to_numpy()
83 ad = response_var[response_var['code'] == 'AD'].loc[:,rv[1]].to_numpy()
84 bd = response_var[response_var['code'] == 'BD'].loc[:,rv[1]].to_numpy()
85 abd = response_var[response_var['code'] == 'ABD'].loc[:,rv[1]].to_numpy()
86 cd = response_var[response_var['code'] == 'CD'].loc[:,rv[1]].to_numpy()
87 acd = response_var[response_var['code'] == 'ACD'].loc[:,rv[1]].to_numpy()
88 bcd = response_var[response_var['code'] == 'BCD'].loc[:,rv[1]].to_numpy()
89 abcd = response_var[response_var['code'] == 'ABCD'].loc[:,rv[1]].to_numpy()
90 means_all = np.array([np.mean(a), np.mean(b), np.mean(ab), np.mean(c),
np.mean(ac), np.mean(bc), np.mean(abc), np.mean(d),↪→
91 np.mean(ad), np.mean(bd), np.mean(abd), np.mean(cd), np.mean(acd),
np.mean(bcd), np.mean(abcd)])↪→
92 total = np.array([one, a, b, ab, c, ac, bc, abc, d, ad, bd, abd, cd, acd, bcd,
abcd])↪→
93 contrast_A = np.sum(-one + a - b + ab - c + ac - bc + abc - d + ad - bd + abd -
cd + acd - bcd + abcd)↪→
94 contrast_B = np.sum(-one - a + b + ab - c - ac + bc + abc - d - ad + bd + abd -
cd - acd + bcd + abcd)↪→
95 contrast_AB = np.sum(one - a - b + ab + c - ac - bc + abc + d - ad - bd + abd +
cd - acd - bcd + abcd)↪→
96 contrast_C = np.sum(-one - a - b - ab + c + ac + bc + abc - d - ad - bd - abd +
cd + acd + bcd + abcd)↪→
97 contrast_AC = np.sum(one - a + b - ab - c + ac - bc + abc + d - ad + bd - abd -
cd + acd - bcd + abcd)↪→
98 contrast_BC = np.sum(one + a - b - ab - c - ac + bc + abc + d + ad - bd - abd -
cd - acd + bcd + abcd)↪→
99 contrast_ABC= np.sum(-one+ a + b - ab + c - ac - bc + abc - d + ad + bd - abd +
cd - acd - bcd + abcd)↪→
100 contrast_D = np.sum(-one- a - b - ab - c - ac - bc - abc + d + ad + bd + abd +
cd + acd + bcd + abcd)↪→
101 contrast_AD= np.sum(one - a + b - ab + c - ac + bc - abc - d + ad - bd + abd -
cd + acd - bcd + abcd)↪→
102 contrast_BD = np.sum(one + a - b - ab + c + ac - bc - abc - d - ad + bd + abd -
cd - acd + bcd + abcd)↪→
103 contrast_ABD= np.sum(-one + a + b - ab - c + ac + bc - abc + d - ad - bd + abd +
cd - acd - bcd + abcd)↪→
104 contrast_CD = np.sum(one + a + b + ab - c - ac - bc - abc - d - ad - bd - abd +
cd + acd + bcd + abcd)↪→
105 contrast_ACD = np.sum(-one + a - b + ab + c - ac + bc - abc + d - ad + bd - abd -
cd + acd - bcd + abcd)↪→
106 contrast_BCD = np.sum(-one - a + b + ab + c + ac - bc - abc + d + ad - bd - abd -
cd - acd + bcd + abcd)↪→
107 contrast_ABCD = np.sum(one - a - b + ab - c + ac + bc - abc - d + ad + bd - abd +
cd - acd - bcd + abcd)↪→
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108 contrasts_all = np.array([contrast_A, contrast_B, contrast_AB, contrast_C,
contrast_AC, contrast_BC, contrast_ABC,↪→





110 if(k >= 5):
111 df_index=['A', 'B', 'AB', 'C', 'AC', 'BC', 'ABC', 'D', 'AD', 'BD', 'ABD', 'CD',
'ACD', 'BCD', 'ABCD', 'E', 'AE', 'BE', 'ABE',↪→
112 'CE', 'ACE', 'BCE', 'ABCE','DE', 'ADE', 'BDE', 'ABDE', 'CDE', 'ACDE', 'BCDE',
'ABCDE', 'Error', 'Total']↪→
113 e = response_var[response_var['code'] == 'E'].loc[:,rv[1]].to_numpy()
114 ae = response_var[response_var['code'] == 'AE'].loc[:,rv[1]].to_numpy()
115 be = response_var[response_var['code'] == 'BE'].loc[:,rv[1]].to_numpy()
116 abe = response_var[response_var['code'] == 'ABE'].loc[:,rv[1]].to_numpy()
117 ce = response_var[response_var['code'] == 'CE'].loc[:,rv[1]].to_numpy()
118 ace = response_var[response_var['code'] == 'ACE'].loc[:,rv[1]].to_numpy()
119 bce = response_var[response_var['code'] == 'BCE'].loc[:,rv[1]].to_numpy()
120 abce = response_var[response_var['code'] == 'ABCE'].loc[:,rv[1]].to_numpy()
121 de = response_var[response_var['code'] == 'DE'].loc[:,rv[1]].to_numpy()
122 ade = response_var[response_var['code'] == 'ADE'].loc[:,rv[1]].to_numpy()
123 bde = response_var[response_var['code'] == 'BDE'].loc[:,rv[1]].to_numpy()
124 abde = response_var[response_var['code'] == 'ABDE'].loc[:,rv[1]].to_numpy()
125 cde = response_var[response_var['code'] == 'CDE'].loc[:,rv[1]].to_numpy()
126 acde = response_var[response_var['code'] == 'ACDE'].loc[:,rv[1]].to_numpy()
127 bcde = response_var[response_var['code'] == 'BCDE'].loc[:,rv[1]].to_numpy()
128 abcde = response_var[response_var['code'] == 'ABCDE'].loc[:,rv[1]].to_numpy()
129 means_all = np.array([np.mean(a), np.mean(b), np.mean(ab), np.mean(c),
np.mean(ac), np.mean(bc), np.mean(abc), np.mean(d),↪→




133 total = np.array([one, a, b, ab, c, ac, bc, abc, d, ad, bd, abd, cd, acd, bcd,
abcd,↪→
134 e,ae,be,abe,ce,ace,bce,abce,de,ade,bde,abde,cde,acde,bcde,abcde])
135 contrast_A = np.sum(-one + a - b + ab - c + ac - bc + abc - d + ad - bd
+ abd - cd + acd - bcd + abcd↪→
136 - e + ae - be + abe - ce + ace - bce + abce - de + ade - bde + abde - cde +
acde - bcde + abcde)↪→
137 contrast_B = np.sum(-one - a + b + ab - c - ac + bc + abc - d - ad + bd
+ abd - cd - acd + bcd + abcd↪→
138 - e - ae + be + abe - ce - ace + bce + abce - de - ade + bde + abde - cde -
acde + bcde + abcde)↪→
139 contrast_AB = np.sum(one - a - b + ab + c - ac - bc + abc + d - ad - bd
+ abd + cd - acd - bcd + abcd↪→
140 + e - ae - be + abe + ce - ace - bce + abce + de - ade - bde + abde + cde -
acde - bcde + abcde)↪→
141 contrast_C = np.sum(-one - a - b - ab + c + ac + bc + abc - d - ad - bd
- abd + cd + acd + bcd + abcd↪→
142 - e - ae - be - abe + ce + ace + bce + abce - de - ade - bde - abde + cde +
acde + bcde + abcde)↪→
143 contrast_AC = np.sum(one - a + b - ab - c + ac - bc + abc + d - ad + bd
- abd - cd + acd - bcd + abcd↪→
144 + e - ae + be - abe - ce + ace - bce + abce + de - ade + bde - abde - cde +
acde - bcde + abcde)↪→
145 contrast_BC = np.sum(one + a - b - ab - c - ac + bc + abc + d + ad - bd
- abd - cd - acd + bcd + abcd↪→
146 + e + ae - be - abe - ce - ace + bce + abce + de + ade - bde - abde - cde -
acde + bcde + abcde)↪→
147 contrast_ABC= np.sum(-one + a + b - ab + c - ac - bc + abc - d + ad + bd
- abd + cd - acd - bcd + abcd↪→
148 - e + ae + be - abe + ce - ace - bce + abce - de + ade + bde - abde + cde
- acde - bcde + abcde)↪→
149 contrast_D = np.sum(-one - a - b - ab - c - ac - bc - abc + d + ad + bd
+ abd + cd + acd + bcd + abcd↪→
145
150 - e - ae - be - abe - ce - ace - bce - abce + de + ade + bde + abde + cde
+ acde + bcde + abcde)↪→
151 contrast_AD= np.sum(one - a + b - ab + c - ac + bc - abc - d + ad - bd
+ abd - cd + acd - bcd + abcd↪→
152 + e - ae + be - abe + ce - ace + bce - abce - de + ade - bde + abde - cde +
acde - bcde + abcde)↪→
153 contrast_BD = np.sum(one + a - b - ab + c + ac - bc - abc - d - ad + bd
+ abd - cd - acd + bcd + abcd↪→
154 + e + ae - be - abe + ce + ace - bce - abce - de - ade + bde + abde - cde -
acde + bcde + abcde)↪→
155 contrast_ABD= np.sum(-one + a + b - ab - c + ac + bc - abc + d - ad - bd
+ abd + cd - acd - bcd + abcd↪→
156 - e + ae + be - abe - ce + ace + bce - abce + de - ade - bde + abde + cde -
acde - bcde + abcde)↪→
157 contrast_CD = np.sum(one + a + b + ab - c - ac - bc - abc - d - ad - bd
- abd + cd + acd + bcd + abcd↪→
158 + e + ae + be + abe - ce - ace - bce - abce - de - ade - bde - abde + cde +
acde + bcde + abcde)↪→
159 contrast_ACD = np.sum(-one + a - b + ab + c - ac + bc - abc + d - ad +
bd - abd - cd + acd - bcd + abcd↪→
160 - e + ae - be + abe + ce - ace + bce - abce + de - ade + bde - abde - cde
+ acde - bcde + abcde)↪→
161 contrast_BCD = np.sum(-one - a + b + ab + c + ac - bc - abc + d + ad -
bd - abd - cd - acd + bcd + abcd↪→
162 - e - ae + be + abe + ce + ace - bce - abce + de + ade - bde - abde - cde
- acde + bcde + abcde)↪→
163 contrast_ABCD = np.sum(one - a - b + ab - c + ac + bc - abc - d + ad +
bd - abd + cd - acd - bcd + abcd↪→
164 + e - ae - be + abe - ce + ace + bce - abce - de + ade + bde - abde + cde
- acde - bcde + abcde)↪→
165 contrast_E = np.sum(-one - a - b - ab - c - ac - bc - abc - d - ad - bd
- abd - cd - acd - bcd - abcd↪→
166 + e + ae + be + abe + ce + ace + bce + abce + de + ade + bde + abde + cde +
acde + bcde + abcde)↪→
167 contrast_AE = np.sum(one - a + b - ab + c - ac + bc - abc + d - ad + bd
- abd + cd - acd + bcd - abcd↪→
168 - e + ae - be + abe - ce + ace - bce + abce - de + ade - bde + abde -
cde + acde - bcde + abcde)↪→
169 contrast_BE= np.sum(one + a - b - ab + c + ac - bc - abc + d + ad - bd
- abd + cd + acd - bcd - abcd↪→
170 - e - ae + be + abe - ce - ace + bce + abce - de - ade + bde + abde - cde -
acde + bcde + abcde)↪→
171 contrast_ABE= np.sum(-one + a + b - ab - c + ac + bc - abc - d + ad + bd
- abd - cd + acd + bcd - abcd↪→
172 + e - ae - be + abe + ce - ace - bce + abce + de - ade - bde + abde + cde
- acde - bcde + abcde)↪→
173 contrast_CE= np.sum(one + a + b + ab - c - ac - bc - abc + d + ad + bd
+ abd - cd - acd - bcd - abcd↪→
174 - e - ae - be - abe + ce + ace + bce + abce - de - ade - bde - abde + cde +
acde + bcde + abcde)↪→
175 contrast_ACE= np.sum(-one + a - b + ab + c - ac + bc - abc - d + ad - bd
+ abd + cd - acd + bcd - abcd↪→
176 + e - ae + be - abe - ce + ace - bce + abce + de - ade + bde - abde - cde
+ acde - bcde + abcde)↪→
177 contrast_BCE= np.sum(-one - a + b + ab + c + ac - bc - abc - d - ad + bd
+ abd + cd + acd - bcd - abcd↪→
178 + e + ae - be - abe - ce - ace + bce + abce + de + ade - bde - abde -
cde - acde + bcde + abcde)↪→
179 contrast_ABCE= np.sum(one - a - b + ab - c + ac + bc - abc + d - ad - bd
+ abd - cd + acd + bcd - abcd↪→
180 - e + ae + be - abe + ce - ace - bce + abce - de + ade + bde - abde + cde
- acde - bcde + abcde)↪→
181 contrast_DE= np.sum(one + a + b + ab + c + ac + bc + abc - d - ad - bd
- abd - cd - acd - bcd - abcd↪→
182 - e - ae - be - abe - ce - ace - bce - abce + de + ade + bde + abde + cde +
acde + bcde + abcde)↪→
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183 contrast_ADE= np.sum(-one + a - b + ab - c + ac - bc + abc + d - ad + bd
- abd + cd - acd + bcd - abcd↪→
184 + e - ae + be - abe + ce - ace + bce - abce - de + ade - bde + abde - cde
+ acde - bcde + abcde)↪→
185 contrast_BDE= np.sum(-one - a + b + ab - c - ac + bc + abc + d + ad - bd
- abd + cd + acd - bcd - abcd↪→
186 + e + ae - be - abe + ce + ace - bce - abce - de - ade + bde + abde - cde
- acde + bcde + abcde)↪→
187 contrast_ABDE= np.sum(one - a - b + ab + c - ac - bc + abc - d + ad + bd
- abd - cd + acd + bcd - abcd↪→
188 - e + ae + be - abe - ce + ace + bce - abce + de - ade - bde + abde + cde
- acde - bcde + abcde)↪→
189 contrast_CDE= np.sum(-one - a - b - ab + c + ac + bc + abc + d + ad + bd
+ abd - cd - acd - bcd - abcd↪→
190 + e + ae + be + abe - ce - ace - bce - abce - de - ade - bde - abde + cde
+ acde + bcde + abcde)↪→
191 contrast_ACDE= np.sum(one - a + b - ab - c + ac - bc + abc - d + ad - bd
+ abd + cd - acd + bcd - abcd↪→
192 - e + ae - be + abe + ce - ace + bce - abce + de - ade + bde - abde - cde
+ acde - bcde + abcde)↪→
193 contrast_BCDE= np.sum(one + a - b - ab - c - ac + bc + abc - d - ad + bd
+ abd + cd + acd - bcd - abcd↪→
194 - e - ae + be + abe + ce + ace - bce - abce + de + ade - bde - abde - cde
- acde + bcde + abcde)↪→
195 contrast_ABCDE= np.sum(-one + a + b - ab + c - ac - bc + abc + d - ad -
bd + abd - cd + acd + bcd - abcd↪→
196 + e - ae - be + abe - ce + ace + bce - abce - de + ade + bde - abde +
cde - acde - bcde + abcde)↪→
197
198 contrasts_all = np.array([contrast_A, contrast_B, contrast_AB, contrast_C,
contrast_AC, contrast_BC, contrast_ABC,↪→
199 contrast_D, contrast_AD, contrast_BD, contrast_ABD, contrast_CD,
contrast_ACD, contrast_BCD, contrast_ABCD,↪→
200 contrast_E, contrast_AE, contrast_BE, contrast_ABE, contrast_CE,
contrast_ACE, contrast_BCE, contrast_ABCE,↪→




204 # Sum Squares
205 num_effects = np.power(2,k)-1
206 num_elements = num_effects+2
207 sum_squares = np.ones(num_elements) #All effects plus error and total
208 for i in range(num_effects):
209 sum_squares[i] = np.square(contrasts_all[i])/(n*np.power(2,k))
210 total_mean = np.mean(total)
211 SST = np.sum(np.square(total - total_mean))
212 SSE = SST - np.sum(sum_squares[0:num_effects])
213 sum_squares[num_effects] = SSE
214 sum_squares[num_effects+1] = SST
215
216 #Degrees of Freedom
217 DF = np.ones(num_elements)
218 DF[num_effects] = np.power(2,k)*(n-1) # Error DoF
219 DF[num_effects+1] = n*np.power(2,k)-1 # Total DoF
220
221 #Mean Squares
222 mean_squares = np.ones(sum_squares.size)
223 for i in range(num_elements):
224 mean_squares[i] = sum_squares[i]/DF[i]
225 MSE = mean_squares[num_effects]
226
227 #F-values
228 f_vals = np.ones(num_elements)
229 f_vals[num_effects:] = -1
230 f_crits = np.ones(num_elements)




234 p_vals = np.ones(num_elements)
235 p_vals[num_effects:] = -1
236
237 #Effect Estimates
238 effects = np.ones(num_elements)
239 effects[num_effects:] = -1
240
241 #Response variable averages
242 means = np.ones(num_elements)
243 means[num_effects:] = -1
244
245 #Build datafile
246 for i in range(num_effects):
247 F0 = mean_squares[i]/MSE
248 f_vals[i] = F0
249 f_crits[i] = stats.f.ppf(1-alpha,DF[i],DF[num_effects])
250 p_vals[i] = 1 - stats.f.cdf(F0, DF[i],DF[num_effects])
251 effects[i] = contrasts_all[i]/(n*np.power(2,k-1))
252 means[i] = means_all[i]
253
254 anova_df_numpy = np.array([means, effects, sum_squares, DF, mean_squares, f_vals,
f_crits, p_vals])↪→
255 anova_df_pandas = pd.DataFrame(data=anova_df_numpy.T, index=df_index,
columns=['Sample Mean','Effect Est.','Sum of Squares', 'df', 'Mean Square',
'F0', 'F Threshold', 'p-value'])
↪→
↪→
256 anova_df_pandas = anova_df_pandas.replace(to_replace=-1,value='')
257
258 #The deprecated function. Changes p-value to float64 so it can be rounded properly
259 anova_df_pandas['p-value']=
anova_df_pandas['p-value'].convert_objects(convert_numeric=True)↪→




264 significant_factors = anova_df_pandas[(anova_df_pandas['p-value'] <
alpha)].round(5)↪→
265
266 #Ideal candidates are less then the unoptimized mean...
267 candidiate_factors = significant_factors[(significant_factors['Sample Mean'] <
np.mean(one))].sort_values(by=['Sample Mean'])↪→
268
269 longest = ""
270
271 #Print all the significant factors at chosen p-value
272 if significant_factors.empty == False:
273 anova_df_pandas[(anova_df_pandas['p-value'] < alpha)].to_csv("results/anova/" +
sys.argv[6]+"-"+input_csv_parse[2]+"-"+rv[0]+"-"+rv[1]+"-anova-significant.csv")↪→
274
275 #Print them all to another file
276 anova_df_pandas.to_csv("results/anova/" + sys.argv[6]+"-"+
input_csv_parse[2]+"-"+rv[0]+"-"+rv[1]+"-anova-all.csv")↪→
277
278 #If I have significant candidate factors with sample mean < unoptimized mean:
279 if candidiate_factors.empty == False:
280 print("\nSignificant Factors (alpha = " + str(alpha) + ")")
281 print(significant_factors.sort_values(by=['Sample Mean']))
282 #candidiate_factors_index = candidiate_factors[(candidiate_factors['Sample Mean']
< np.mean(one))].sort_values(by=['Sample Mean']).index.array↪→
283 candidiate_factors_index = candidiate_factors.sort_values(by=['Sample
Mean']).index.array↪→
284
285 for x in candidiate_factors_index:
286 if len(x) > len(longest):
287 longest = x
288
289 print("\n!!--Statistically Significant Effects--!! ")
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290 all = ""
291 for y in candidiate_factors_index:
292 all = all + y + ","




297 #If all my significant candidate factors actually have a worse sample mean:
298 else:
299 print("\n ***No statistically significant effects with sample mean < unoptimized
mean***\n")↪→
300 candidiate_factors_index = anova_df_pandas[(anova_df_pandas['Sample Mean'] <
np.mean(one))].sort_values(by=['Sample Mean']).index.array↪→
301
302 all = ""
303 for y in candidiate_factors_index:
304 all = all + y + ","
305








314 #Take the factor combo with the best sample mean and keep trying
315 print("Lowest observed sample mean (Target to Beat)")
316 print(int(anova_df_pandas[(anova_df_pandas['Sample Mean'] <
np.mean(one))]['Sample Mean'].min()))↪→
317 print("Next best guesses (produced a sample mean lower than unoptimized)")
318
319 if len(all) == 0:




324 #Normplot of effects
325 if len(sys.argv) == 7:
326 fig = plt.figure(figsize=(6,4))
327 probscale.probplot(effects,plottype='prob',probax='y',problabel='Standard Normal
Probabilities',bestfit=True)↪→
328 plt.xlabel("Normal Probability Plot of Effect Estimates")





1 import pandas as pd
2 import numpy as np
3 import sys
4
5 #Best Mean Test
6 if len(sys.argv) <= 3:
7 print("Not enough args usage: anova.py <*.csv> <rv1,rv2> <target to beat>")
8 print("ex: best-mean.py testdata.csv nicdrop 95000")
9 print("<rv> is response variable")
10 exit()
11
12 target_to_beat = int(sys.argv[3]) #factors
13 rv = sys.argv[2].split(',')
14
15 data = pd.read_csv(sys.argv[1], header=[0,1])
16 response_var = data[[rv[0],'factors']]
17 response_var.columns = response_var.columns.get_level_values(1)
18
19 print("Re-run factor means")
20 print(response_var.groupby('code')[rv[1]].mean())
21
22 print("Lowest observed sample mean (target to beat)")
23 print(response_var.groupby('code')[rv[1]].mean().min())
24






27 improved_factors_bools = (response_var.groupby('code')[rv[1]].mean() <
target_to_beat).to_numpy() #boolean series↪→
28 all = ""
29 i=0
30 for y in candidiate_factors_index:
31 if improved_factors_bools[i]:
32 all = all + y + ","
33 i=i+1
34 print("Effects")

















12 #Only supporting debian sensors at this point though yum should not be a
problem as future work↪→
13 - name: Check OS Version
14 fail: msg="Currently only supports Debian based sensors."
15 when: ansible_facts['os_family'] != "Debian"
16
17 #This assumes all your SSH passwords are the same.
18 #Or, run this playbook once per host with "-t auth -l "hostname" -k -K"




23 key: "{{ lookup('file', '~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub') }}"
24 tags: auth
25





31 line: '%sudo ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL'




36 - name: Install Prerequisites (may take awhile)
37 apt:












































81 - name: Create Sensor Directory
82 file:
83 path: "{{ sensor_dir }}"
84 state: directory
85 owner: "{{ ansible_user }}"




90 - name: Create Log Directory
91 file:




96 - name: Copy Default Suricata Rules
97 copy:
98 src: suricata.rules




103 - name: Download and Unpack Suricata Source
104 unarchive:
105 src: https://www.openinfosecfoundation.org/download/suricata-5.0.0.tar.gz
106 dest: "{{ sensor_dir }}"
107 remote_src: yes










118 - name: Run configure
119 shell: "./configure --prefix=/usr/ --sysconfdir=/etc/ --localstatedir=/var/"
120 args:
121 chdir: "{{ sensor_dir }}/suricata-5.0.0"
122 creates: "{{ sensor_dir }}/suricata-5.0.0/Makefile"
123 register: suricata_version
124 when: suricata_source is changed or not previous_failure.stat.exists
125 tags: suricata
126
127 - name: Build Suricata Latest
128 shell: make
129 args:
130 chdir: "{{ sensor_dir }}/suricata-5.0.0/"
131 register: suricata_build
132 when: suricata_version is changed
133 tags: suricata
134









143 when: suricata_build is changed
144
145 - name: Standardize Hostname
146 shell: |
147 hostnamectl set-hostname {{ ansible_hostname }}
148 echo "127.0.0.1 {{ ansible_hostname }}" > /etc/hosts
149 become: yes
150 when: ansible_facts['hostname'] != ansible_hostname
151
152 - name: Clean Up old Results
153 shell: |
154 rm -rf {{ sensor_dir }}/*.csv
155 rm -rf {{ sensor_dir }}/*.pid












168 #This assumes your ansible host is also the traffic generator. It doesnt have to
be..↪→






175 - name: Install Prerequisites (may take awhile)
176 when: ansible_facts['os_family'] == "Debian"
177 apt:




182 #this may be missing some things to build fragroute support
183 #fragrout and tcpreplay-edit are needed to fix dataset pcaps that have















198 - name: Set Docker Permissions























221 - name: Create Generator Directory
222 file:
223 path: |
224 "{{ generator_dir }}"
225 "{{ generator_dir }}/results"
226 "{{ generator_dir }}/results/verbose"






233 ## netmap ##
234 - name: Clone Latest netmap Source
235 git:
236 repo: https://github.com/luigirizzo/netmap.git




241 #Using this specific NIC so select it's driver manually
242 #Netmaps auto detect is flaky esp on kernel 5+
243 - name: Build netmap Makefile
244 shell: ./configure --select-version=igb:5.3.5.39 --driver-suffix=-netmap
245 args:
246 chdir: "{{ generator_dir }}/netmap"
247 #creates: "{{ generator_dir }}/netmap/config.status"
248 register: netmap_version
249 when: netmap_source is changed
250 tags: netmap
251
252 - name: Build netmap
253 shell: make
254 args:
255 chdir: "{{ generator_dir }}/netmap"
256 #creates: "{{ generator_dir }}/netmap/netmap.ko"
257 register: netmap_build
258 when: netmap_version is changed
259 tags: netmap
260
261 - name: Install netmap
262 shell: make install
263 args:
264 chdir: "{{ generator_dir }}/netmap"
265 become: yes
266 register: netmap_install
267 when: netmap_build is changed
268 tags: netmap
269
270 #anytime the kernel is updated these modules will need rebuilt
271 #if this fails after a reboot the kernel may have changed,
272 #delete the netmap/ folder and rebuild it
273 - name: Enable Netmap Drivers
274 shell: |
275 rmmod igb 2> /dev/null
276 rmmod igb_netmap 2> /dev/null
277 rmmod netmap 2> /dev/null
278 insmod {{ generator_dir }}/netmap/netmap.ko





283 ## tcpreplay ##




287 dest: "{{ generator_dir }}"
288 remote_src: yes
289 creates: "{{ generator_dir }}/tcpreplay-4.3.1/"
290 register: tcpreplay_source
291
292 - name: Build tcpreplay Makefile
293 shell: "./configure --with-netmap={{ generator_dir }}/netmap"
294 args:
295 chdir: "{{ generator_dir }}/tcpreplay-4.3.1"
296 #creates: "{{ generator_dir }}/tcpreplay-4.3.1/Makefile"
297 when: tcpreplay_source is changed or netmap_build is changed
298 register: tcpreplay_version
299
300 - name: Build tcpreplay
301 shell: make
302 args:
303 chdir: "{{ generator_dir }}/tcpreplay-4.3.1/"
304 #creates: "{{ generator_dir }}/tcpreplay-4.3.1/src/tcpreplay"
305 register: tcpreplay_build
306 when: tcpreplay_version is changed
307
308 - name: Install tcpreplay
309 shell: make install
310 args:
311 chdir: "{{ generator_dir }}/tcpreplay-4.3.1/"
312 become: yes
313 when: tcpreplay_version is changed
314













328 # docker run -d --name kibana --net experiment -p 5601:5601 kibana:7.5.0
















13 #Facts inherited from previous tests
14 interface_pps_limit: 70000










25 #Facts inherited from previous tests
26 interface_pps_limit: 158000

















44 #Facts inherited from previous tests
45 interface_pps_limit: 102000









55 #Facts inherited from previous tests
56 interface_pps_limit: 148000










66 #Facts inherited from previous tests
67 interface_pps_limit: 159000














1 ###Master variable file for all playbooks
2































34 #New API (NAPI) IRQ budget
35 #default = 300. Will eventually hit hard time limit of "2 jiffies"
36 NAPI_budget: 1200
37
38 #Max Kernel Backlog
39 #default = 1000
40 backlog: 32768
41
42 #Socket receive queue memory, in bytes
43 #default = 212992
44 rmem_max: 83886080
45
46 #Receive Flow Steering (RFS) hash table size and per queue flow count




51 #NAPI backlog poll loop weight
52 #default = 64
53 backlog_weight: 1200
54
55 #libpcap buffer size, in KiB
56 #default = 2 MB = ~2000 KiB
57 libpcap_buffer: 250000 #64 MB
58 libpcap_buffer_size: 2000 #initial
59
60 #suricata runmode




65 #default = 1024
66 suricata_max_pending: 8096
67
68 #suricata detect memory grouping aggressiveness




72 #af-packet memory map ring feature






79 #More research may be worthwhile here. It seemed to boost suricata when off?
80 #lan78xx driver on rpi3 fails to read random traffic from pkt-gen when on.
81 #probably due to UDP header / payload mismatch




86 #Moves timestamping of rx packets to after they enter load balanced RPS queue vs
before↪→
87 #default = on
88 rx_timestamp_status: '0'
89
90 #Large Receive / Generic Receive offload on/off.
91 #Off for suricata








100 num_packets_30sec: "{{ line_pps_limit|int * 30 }}"
101 num_packets_cic_monday: 17997887 #avg 590 bytes





These are the template playbooks used to build the three specific tests
See begining of Appendix D for preparatory setup and general tips & tricks
160
general-benchmark-main.yml
1 #This playbook acts as the "main" function
2 #It has to be its own file since the "tasks:" keyword
3 #can only appear once within all the loops







11 - name: Clear gathered facts from all currently targeted hosts
12 meta: clear_facts #start fresh
13
14 - name: Clean Up old Results
15 shell: |





21 - name: Record Initial Variable Levels
22 set_fact:
23 A_levels: "{{A_levels}} + [ '%%%%%' ]"
24 B_levels: "{{B_levels}} + [ '%%%%%' ]"
25 C_levels: "{{C_levels}} + [ '%%%%%' ]"
26 D_levels: "{{D_levels}} + [ '%%%%%' ]"
27 E_levels: "{{E_levels}} + [ '%%%%%' ]"
28




33 - name: Done Looping, Store Final Result Facts
34 set_fact:
35 your_result: "{{ %%%%% }}"
36 A_best: "{{ A_levels[-1] }}"
37 B_best: "{{ B_levels[-1] }}"
38 C_best: "{{ C_levels[-1] }}"
39 D_best: "{{ D_levels[-1] }}"
40 E_best: "{{ E_levels[-1] }}"
41 cacheable: yes
42




47 echo "{{inventory_hostname}} Test Final"\
48 > results/"{{inventory_hostname}}"-testxyz-final.log
49
50 echo "- A levels: {{ A_levels | to_yaml }}\
51 - B levels: {{ B_levels | to_yaml }}\
52 - C levels: {{ C_levels | to_yaml }}\
53 - D levels: {{ D_levels | to_yaml }}\
54 - E levels: {{ E_levels | to_yaml }}"\
55 >> results/"{{inventory_hostname}}"-testxyz-final.log
56
57 echo "- Best (A): {{ A_best | to_yaml }}\
58 - Best (B): {{ B_best | to_yaml }}\
59 - Best (C): {{ C_best | to_yaml }}\
60 - Best (D): {{ D_best | to_yaml }}\
61 - Best (E): {{ E_best | to_yaml }}"\
62 >> results/"{{inventory_hostname}}"-testxyz-final.log
63
64 echo "- Number of Loops: {{ test_counter | to_yaml }}\
65 - Factor History: {{ significant_factors_history | to_yaml }}\
66 - Loop Bests: {{ last_loop_best_history | to_yaml }}\






72 - name: Display Variable States
73 debug:
74 msg: "
75 - A levels: {{ A_levels | to_yaml }}
76 - B levels: {{ B_levels | to_yaml }}
77 - C levels: {{ C_levels | to_yaml }}
78 - D levels: {{ D_levels | to_yaml }}
79 - E levels: {{ E_levels | to_yaml }}"
80
81 - name: Display Factor History
82 debug:
83 msg: "
84 - Number of Loops: {{ test_counter | to_yaml }}
85 - Factor History: {{ significant_factors_history | to_yaml }}"
86
87 - name: Display Final Optimization Results
88 debug:
89 msg: "
90 - Best (A): {{ A_best | to_yaml }}
91 - Best (B): {{ B_best | to_yaml }}
92 - Best (C): {{ C_best | to_yaml }}
93 - Best (D): {{ D_best | to_yaml }}
94 - Best (E): {{ E_best | to_yaml }}"
95
96 - name: Final Result
97 debug:
98 msg: "Your final score: {{ %%%%% }}"
162
general-benchmark-outerloop.yml
1 - name: Begin First Middle Loop
2 include_tasks: general-benchmark-middleloop.yml














17 python anova.py 'results/{{ inventory_hostname }}-results-run1.csv'
<<**RESPONSE VARIABLE**>> "{{total_factors}}" "{{replicates|length}}"







22 when: "test_counter == 1"
23






28 significant_factors_history: "{{significant_factors_history}} + [
'{{anova.stdout_lines[anova.stdout_lines|length -1]}}' ]"↪→
29 target_to_beat: "{{anova.stdout_lines[anova.stdout_lines|length -3]|int}}"
30 last_loop_best: "{{anova.stdout_lines[anova.stdout_lines|length -3]|int}}"
31 last_loop_best_history: "{{last_loop_best_history}} + [
'{{anova.stdout_lines[anova.stdout_lines|length -3]|int}}' ]"↪→
32 when: "test_counter == 1"
33
34 - name: Record Significant A Level
35 set_fact:
36 A_levels: "{{A_levels}} + [ '{{%%%A%%%}}' ]"
37 when: "'A' in significant_factors_string"
38
39 - name: Record Significant B Level
40 set_fact:
41 B_levels: "{{B_levels}} + [ '{{%%%B%%%}}' ]"
42 when: "'B' in significant_factors_string"
43
44 - name: Record Significant C Level
45 set_fact:
46 C_levels: "{{C_levels}} + [ '{{%%%C%%%}}' ]"
47 when: "'C' in significant_factors_string"
48
49 - name: Record Significant D Level
50 set_fact:
51 D_levels: "{{D_levels}} + [ '{{%%%D%%%}}' ]"
52 when: "'D' in significant_factors_string"
53
54 - name: Record Significant E Level
55 set_fact:
56 E_levels: "{{E_levels}} + [ '{{%%%E%%%}}' ]"
57 when: "'E' in significant_factors_string"
58
59 - name: Increment Test Counter
60 set_fact:
61 test_counter: "{{ test_counter | int + 1 }}"
62
163
63 - name: Reset Results
64 shell: |





70 - name: Target To Beat
71 debug:
72 msg: "Target to Beat is {{target_to_beat}}. Using Factors
{{significant_factors_array | to_yaml}}"↪→
73
74 - name: Increment Loop Multiplier
75 set_fact:
76 loop_multiplier: "{{ test_counter|int**test_counter|int }}"
77







85 when: "'NONE' not in significant_factors_array"
86
87 - name: Last Loop Results
88 debug:
89 msg: "Last Loop best was {{last_loop_best}}. Needs to beat {{target_to_beat}}.
Was Iteration {{ test_counter }}"↪→
90
91 - name: Check Last Loop Results
92 block:
93 - name: Check Recursive Base Case
94 fail:
95 #Maybe run a set number of times....
96 msg: "Continuing {{test_counter}} < 4"
97 when: "test_counter | int < 4"
98
99 #Or have a target
100 #msg: "Still room to improve {{last_loop_best}} < {{target_to_beat}}"
101 #when: "last_loop_best < target_to_beat"
102
103 rescue:
104 - name: Update Target to Beat
105 set_fact:
106 target_to_beat: "{{ last_loop_best }}"
107 loop_multiplier: "{{ test_counter|int**test_counter|int }}"
108
109 #Recursively call self to keep going




1 #This playbook is the "middle" loop






7 #If any configuration changes are not undone with a reboot,
8 #add a playbook here to manually "revert" them
9
10 - name: Set Static Controls
11 include_tasks: general-static-controls.yml
12
13 - name: Set Variable Factor Controls
14 include_tasks: general-variable-controls.yml
15







23 - name: Begin Inner Loop
24 include_tasks: general-benchmark-innerloop.yml


















39 #if the last item in loop and not inital run




44 - name: Update Last Middle Loop Best
45 set_fact:





49 significant_factors_history: "{{significant_factors_history}} + [
'{{anova.stdout_lines[anova.stdout_lines|length -1]}}' ]"↪→
50 last_loop_best_history: "{{last_loop_best_history}} + [
'{{anova.stdout_lines[anova.stdout_lines|length -3]|int}}' ]"↪→
51 when: "ansible_loop.revindex == 1 and test_counter > 1"
165
general-static-controls.yml
1 ###Blanket Optimizations (always apply to all)
2





8 when: "'nvidia' not in group_names"
9 become: yes
10
11 - name: Set MAXN Power Profile on NVIDIA Boards
12 shell: |
13 nvpmodel -m 0
14 jetson_clocks
15 become: yes
16 when: "'nvidia' in group_names"
166
general-variable-controls.yml
1 ##FACTORS UNDER EXPERIMENT
2
3 ###FACTOR A###
4 - name: (Factor A) <%%%>
5 shell: <%%%>
6 become: yes
7 when: "'A' in current_factor_list"
8
9 ###FACTOR B###
10 - name: (Factor B) <%%%>
11 shell: <%%%>
12 become: yes
13 when: "'B' in current_factor_list"
14
15 ###FACTOR C###




20 when: "'C' in current_factor_list"
21
22 ###FACTOR D###




27 when: "'D' in current_factor_list"
28
29 ###FACTOR E###








1 #This playbook is the "inner" loop
2 - name: Launch Performance Monitor (Factors {{ current_factor_list }})
3 shell: "./gather_stats.bash <<**PID**>> <<**SAMPLE RATE**>> {{
current_factor_list }}"↪→
4 args:







12 # <<**YOUR WORKLOAD TASK(S) GOES HERE.....**>>
13 # SEE RATELIMIT TEST FOR EXAMPLE
14
15 - name: Stop Everything
16 shell: kill "$(cat gather.pid)"
17 args:





23 - name: Wait for Results








32 - name: Copy Verbose Results
33 fetch:
34 src: "{{experiment_dir}}/{{ inventory_hostname }}-results-verbose.csv"





39 - name: Copy Totals
40 fetch:
41 src: "{{experiment_dir}}/{{ inventory_hostname }}-results.csv"
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